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OPTIMIZATION AND SIMULATION MODELS TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Fatemeh Karami
May 5, 2020
Organ allocation in the U.S. is administrated by the United Network of
Organ Sharing (UNOS). UNOS’s mission is to ensure fair and equitable allocation
of organs as stated in the Code of Federal Regulations, which reads "neither place of
residence nor place of listing shall be a major determinant of access to transplant".
Despite the regulations, there has been endless controversy surrounding the
disparity in access to organ transplants. In this context, the primary research goal
in this dissertation was to reduce geographic disparity in access to transplants in the
U.S., with a focus on heart and kidney transplants.
To improve access to heart transplants, we first analyzed the status of
geographic disparity and organ utilization under current practice. Next, we used
survival analysis and statistical analysis to measure heart utilization rate across the
country and studied the factors that can improve heart usage. Additionally, we
defined a novel optimization model to modify the geographic boundaries in the U.S.
heart allocation system. Finally, We developed a clinically detailed discrete event
simulation model for the U.S. heart allocation system to evaluate our proposed
changes in in the heart allocation policy stemming from the optimization model.
To improve access to kidney transplants, first, we proposed a simulation -
v
optimization approach for better utilization of donated kidneys from living donor
through a Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) program. Additionally, to reduce
geographic disparity in access to kidney transplants, we used an optimization model
to redesign geographic boundaries in the kidney allocation system.
Our findings indicated that using optimization and simulation models can
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Organ transplant has an important role in medicine and has become an
essential treatment in saving and prolonging lives in a variety of clinical conditions,
as well as in increasing life quality (Beyar, 2011). Hearts, kidneys, livers, lungs and
pancreata are among the vital organs that are regularly used for transplants.
However, the supply of organ in the United States is just not enough to meet the
demand. In the U.S. nearly 50,000 people per year either die on the transplant
waiting list or are removed from the list after waiting so long that they have become
too sick to undergo transplant surgery (OPTN, 2018), and the waiting list continues
to grow, where currently more than 100,000 people are waiting for
transplants(OPTN (2018); see Figure 1).
This shortage of supply has led to the design of different policies for a better
and more efficient allocation of the available organs to people.
Organ allocation in the United States is administrated by the United
Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS), which is the only administrative entity
contracted by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to administer
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). OPTN was created
in 1984 by the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) with the aim of creating an
equitable organ allocation policy. To allocate organs, UNOS currently uses a
multi-stage process in which the U.S. is divided into 58 Organ Procurement
Organizations (OPOs) (Figure 2), which are grouped into 11 UNOS regions (Figure
3). Each of these OPOs is responsible for acquiring and distributing of the organs
procured within its service area, known as the Donor Service Area (DSA).
1
Figure 1. Organ donation and waiting list statistics from 1991 to 2018 (OPTN, 2018)
Allocation rules depend on specific criteria which are different from organ to
organ. These criteria are developed and updated based on discussions involving a
combination of clinical scientific data and ethics based on clinical scientific data.
Even if the overall system is complex, it is possible to make some generalizations.
Generally, before an organ is allocated, all transplant candidates on the waiting list
who are incompatible with the donor are automatically eliminated from any
potential match, and then a possible match is sought among compatible candidates.
Looking at the system from a very high level, compatible transplant candidates are
prioritized based on two main factors: (1) the medical condition of the patient
(including how urgently, she/he needs the organ and the survival benefits), and (2)
the distance between the hospital where the organ became available (i.e., donor
hospital) and the transplant center where the candidate is registered. Both factors
influence the success of a transplant and the post transplant survival of the patient.
Distance, in particular, highly influences the quality of the organ to be transplanted.
Indeed, every organ can be transplanted within a maximum specified cold ischemia
2
Figure 2. Donor Service Area (DSA) of the 58 OPOs in the US
time, which is the time between organ-donor retrieval and the transplantation. The
shorter the cold ischemia time, the better the quality of the organ.
The current system distributes the available organs near donor hospitals first
and then looks for compatible patients at a further distance with exceptions for
patients with high medical urgency (OPTN-Policy, 2018).
For example, the kidney allocation system uses DSAs and UNOS regions for
allocating the organs. When a kidney is donated within a specific DSA, patients
registered in that DSA are prioritized to receive the kidney, and, if any match for
the kidney is not found in that DSA, the allocation rule expands the search to the
region where the kidney is donated. In the end, if no kidney transplant recipient has
been located in the region, the search for a match expands nationally.
As another example, the allocation system for heart transplants is based on
the urgency of patients and concentric zonal structure around donor hospitals
(Figure 4). UNOS assigns a status to each transplant candidate based on their
medical condition (status 1-6, with 1 being the most severe and 6 being the least
severe). A guiding principle for heart allocation is to prioritize those in greatest
need within an acceptable geographic distance. The typical set of zones is defined
3
Figure 3. UNOS regions
through concentric circles (see Figure 22) with increasing radii of 250 miles (Local),
500 miles (Zone A), 1,000 miles (Zone B), 1,500 miles (Zone C), 2,500 miles (Zone
D), and outside 2,500 miles (Zone E). Thus, transplant candidates registered at the
transplant centers located within the donor hospital’s local area receive offers first,
followed by the candidates at the transplant centers in the successive zones.
Figure 4. The zonal structure around donor hospitals for the heart allocation system
4
A The Big Challenge: Geographic Disparity in Access to Transplants
All the allocation policies which are currently applied in the U.S. have been
developed and changed over the years to comply with the principles stated in the
regulation known as the "Final Rule", which was issued by DHHS in 1998 to ensure
an equitable allocation system (Snyder et al., 2018). However, the current allocation
system can still lead to very unfair cases. Existing studies on organ transplants
report various disparities in access to and outcomes of transplantation. Disparities
have been found in terms of race, socioeconomic status, insurance type, and location
of candidate’s residency. Disparity in access to transplant due to candidates’
locations , also known as “geographic disparity”, is the first and foremost discussed.
Geographic disparity in access to transplant occurs, for example, when an organ
may go to a patient who has a less severe status than another candidate, who is
farther away from the procuring OPO, contradicting one of the principals of the
final rule, according to which an equitable allocation of donor organs for potential
recipients "shall not be based on the candidate’s place of residence or place of
listing" (DHHS, 1999).1
Transplant researchers reported geographic disparitys in access to transplant
across transplant centers, OPOs and regions in terms of transplant rate, waiting
time, pre-transplant survival rate, to mention some of the metrics which are used to
compute access to transplant.
1The urgency and importance of such a drawback of the current system is evidenced by a recent
change in the U.S. lung allocation protocol which was triggered after a lawsuit was initiated due to a
severe disparity in access to a lung in the border region of New Jersey and New York (Snyder et al.,
2018). Specifically, on November 19th, 2017, 21 years old Miriam Holman, who had been waiting for
a donor lung in a hospital in New York City, filed a temporary restraining order against the DHHS
to allocate donor lungs based on medical priority instead of candidate place of residence. At the
time of the lawsuit, lungs were allocated first to the candidates within a geographic DSA, then to
other candidates in transplant centers further away. Since the geographic territories of the DSA are
arbitrary, it was possible that a candidate registered in Jersey City, NJ with a medical priority less
than Miriam’s receives an available lung before she does. The US District Court ordered the DHHS
to immediately review the lung allocation policy in light of the Final Rule requirements. In less
than a week, organ allocation for donor lungs was changed, considering as a first level distribution
not the DSA rather a 250 nautical miles circle around donor hospitals.
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A recent study on the heart allocation system, for example, shows that the
transplant rate performed on higher urgency candidates varies significantly from
37% to 86% across UNOS regions (Meyer et al., 2015). Another study of kidney
allocation indicates that the waiting time for transplantation ranges from 6 months
to more than 5 years across DSAs (Davis et al., 2014). In the liver allocation
system, the transplant rate and pre-transplant death rate varied 20-fold and
3.3-fold, respectively, across DSAs (Yeh et al., 2011).
In light of this, several researchers have addressed the problem of reducing
geographic disparity in access to transplant for different organs. The approaches can
be grouped into two main categories:
1. Better Usage of Donated Organs: One of the main causes of geographic
disparity is the uneven distribution of supply and demand across the country.
The gap between supply and demand becomes even larger because of the
variability in organ usage rate, organ waste and other factors which influence
the effective use of donated organs (Mathur et al., 2010). A better utilization
of donated organs would be beneficial in reducing the gap between supply and
demand.
2. Alternative Allocation Policies: Several studies propose changes in the current
allocation policies. Gentry et al. (2013), for example, proposed changing the
number of UNOS regions from 11 to 8 to reduce geographic disparity in access
to liver transplants. Davis et al. (2015) studied possible sharing strategies
among OPOs to reduce geographic disparity in access to kidney transplants.
Despite the existing studies to address the problem, there is a consensus that
more research is needed in this area (Koizumi, 2010). In this context, our research
focuses on new methods to reduce geographic disparity in access to kidney and
heart transplants. The proposed methods fall into two research categories,
mentioned before. Specifically, to improve access to heart transplants we design a
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novel robust optimization model to modify the current heart allocation system and
evaluate the performance of our optimization model using a simulation model,
which we develped (Chapter II - IV). To increase access to kidney transplants, we
propose an optimization-simulation approach for a better utilization of donated
organs from living donors within a Kidney Pair Donor (KPD)2 program (Chapter
V). Additionally, to reduce geographic disparity in access to kidney transplants, we
used the optimization model developed in Chapter III, to design geographic
boundaries for the U.S. kidney allocation system. The structure of this dissertation
and the contributions of the research are briefly outlined next.
Chapter II: Analyzing Access to Heart Transplants In this chapter we
assessed the current level of access to heart transplants in the U.S. and the current
level of usage of donated hearts. The chapter is divided into two parts:
In the first part of the chapter we investigated the impact of recently
approved heart allocation policy on the geographic disparity in access to heart
transplants (Policy, 2016). The new policy was introduced with the aim of reducing
waitlist mortality and improving post-transplant survival. The transplant
community has voiced a number of concerns regarding a possible increase in
geographic disparity in access to transplants. No study in the literature addresses
such a concern, which is instead the focus of our analysis. Specifically, we used the
Thoracic Simulation Allocation Model (TSAM)3 to systematically compare the
previous policy and the new implemented policy. We compared four performance
indicators: waiting time, transplant rate, pre-transplant mortality rate, and average
distance traveled by donated hearts.
In the second part of chapter we analyzed the current level of usage of
2KPD program allows incompatible donor-patient pairs to exchange their living donors with other
incompatible pairs within the program (Montgomery et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2004)
3TSAM is a simulation software developed by the US Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
(SRTR) (TSAM, 2017). TSAM has the ability to simulate the allocation of hearts to candidates
waiting for heart transplants based on an event-sequenced Monte Carlo technique.
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donated hearts by exploring data on discarded hearts from 2003 to 2015. We
examined the percentage of donor hearts offer refusal in each OPO, to quantify
geographic disparity in donor heart offer refusal across OPOs. We performed a
post-transplant survival analysis to assess the transplant outcome of the hearts with
previous offer refusals. The results from this analysis can help policy makers in
improving the criteria used to discard donated organs, in identifying the OPOs with
higher offer heart refusal rate, and in improving the OPOs’ performance.
Chapter III: An optimization approach to Address Geographic Disparity
in Access to Heart Transplant The current zonal structure (Figure 4) used in
heart allocation system is homogeneous across donor hospitals and does not
consider the heterogeneity in supply and demand. In Chapter III, we designed a
novel mathematical optimization model to minimize geographic disparity in access
to heart transplants by designing a heterogeneous zonal structure around donor
hospitals. With the heterogeneous zonal structure the zone radius for different
donor hospitals can be different based on the distribution of supply and demand.
Chapter IV: Simulation Model for Evaluating Heart Allocation Policy
We have developed clinically detailed simulation model for the U.S. heart allocation
system to assess and compare the impact of alternative allocation policies, which
was not feasible with the TSAM. For this purpose, we have independently replicated
most of the concepts framed in TSAM and we validated our model with historical
data on the U.S. heart transplants. We used this model to evaluate the effect of
heterogeneous zonal structure, developed in Chapter III, on geographic disparity in
access to heart transplants in the United States.
Chapter V: Optimal Integration of Desensitization Protocols into Kidney
Paired Donation (KPD) Programs We designed and implemented an
optimization-simulation approach to analyze the integration of desensitization
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therapy for patients in a KPD program. The optimization-simulation approach
simulates the dynamic and the evolving environment of a KPD program overtime.
We used our approach to measure the benefit of such integration by performing an
extensive experimental analysis which compares the output of a KPD program
under different scenarios.
The idea of systematically integrating desensitization therapy in a KPD
program is highly innovative. All the current methodological approaches do not
consider such an option, which is instead receiving increasing more attention as a
promising intervention performed in a KPD framework (Montgomery et al., 2005;
Montgomery, 2010; Montgomery et al., 2011).
Chapter VI: Allocating Kidney Through Heterogeneous Circles The
OPTN recently approved a plan to eliminate DSAs and region from kidney
allocation system and to allocate kidneys in 250 miles fixed-distance circles around
donor hospitals, with a continuous priority boost for candidates nearer to the donor
hospital. Homogeneous circles, using the same size circle for every donor hospital,
might not substantially reduce geographic disparity because of heterogeneity in
supply and demand. We designed heterogeneous circles around donor hospitals to




ANALYZING ACCESS TO HEART TRANSPLANTS
A Analyzing Geographic Disparity in Access to Heart Transplants
1 Introduction
Heart failure is a growing health problem affecting over 5 million adults in
the United States (Go et al., 2013b). Heart transplantation is the definitive therapy
with the best favorable outcomes for end-stage (i.e., Stage D) heart disease patients:
1-year survival rate for adult patients who underwent a heart transplant from 2007
through 2009 was 88%, while 3-year and 5-year survival rates were 81% and 75%,
respectively (Israni et al., 2014b). Without a transplant, the 5-year survival rate is
only about 20% (AFZAL AMMAR et al., 2007).
Heart allocation system, like any other organ, is administrated by UNOS.
UNOS’s mission is to ensure fair and equitable allocation of organs as stated in the
Code of Federal Regulations, which reads “neither place of residence nor place of
listing shall be a major determinant of access to a transplant” (DHHS, 1999).
UNOS/OPTN established heart allocation policy in 1988. The system remains in
place today, with only two major policy changes since its inception (Meyer et al.,
2015). The previous allocation system in heart transplant (referred to as the 2006
Policy in the rest of the chapter) is based on the urgency of patients and concentric
geographical zones around donor hospitals. UNOS assigns all transplant candidates
a status which is based on their medical condition, namely Status 1A, 1B, and 2,
with Status 1A being the most urgent patients. A guiding principle for heart
allocation is to give highest priority to those in greatest need within an acceptable
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geographic distance. The typical geographic sequence for heart allocation is local
(i.e., DSA) first, followed by increasing concentric circles, specifically of radii equal
to 500 miles (Zone A), 1000 miles (Zone B), 1500 miles (Zone C), 2500 miles (Zone
D), and more than 2500 miles (Zone E). Waitlisted transplant candidates who are
registered at the transplant centers located within the DSA receive offers first,
followed by the candidates at the transplant centers within the next concentric
circle area(Table 1 shows the start part of allocation sequence for 2006 Policy).
The OPTN/UNOS Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee pointed out
that despite all the improvements resulting from the 2006 Policy, mortality on
waiting lists is still high for certain groups of patients (Meyer et al., 2015). As a
result, in December 2016 the thoracic committee approved a new policy (referred to
as 2016 Policy in the rest of the chapter) (OPTN, 2016). The proposed policy had
the twofold aim of (i) reducing waiting list mortality rates among the most severe
patients, and (ii) improving post-transplant survival rates. This new allocation
system groups recipients into 6 severity statuses (Status 1 to 6, status 1
corresponding to the most severe patient) in contrast with the previous three levels.
Table 2 shows the correspondence between the six-tiered severity status system
approved in 2016 and the three-tiered severity status classification of the 2006
Policy.
The 2016 Policy introduces the so-called "broader sharing" which alters the
sequence of allocation for the most urgent candidates. Under the broader sharing,
hearts from adult deceased donors will be offered first to compatible adult status 1
within the local DSA plus Zone A around the donor hospital, then to compatible
adult status 1 candidates within Zone B. If no matches are made for these
candidates, hearts will be offered to the candidates in lower urgency statuses
beginning at the local DSA (Table 3 shows the start part of allocation sequence for
2006 Policy) (OPTN, 2005).
Prior research reports that access to a heart transplant, with 2006 policy,
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depends on the location due to the geographic variation in the donor-patient ratio
(Kobashigawa, 2014; Meyer et al., 2015; Rivard et al., 2018) and that more research
is warranted in this area (Kobashigawa, 2014). A study demonstrates that the
percentage of transplants performed on higher urgency adult candidates (Status 1)
varies from 37% to 86% across geographic regions (Meyer et al., 2015). This is
contrary to the founding principles of UNOS, which focus on recipient chance wait
list equality.
While the 2016 Policy is expected to improve transplant rates and waiting
times for the most severe patients, the transplant community has voiced a number
of concerns regarding geographic disparity in access to heart transplant in this new
approved policy (OPTN-Policy, 2018). The main goal of this chapter is to analyze
how access to heart transplant varies across geography both under the 2006 and the
2016 Policy using simulations. To achieve this goal, we used a heart version of a
widely used simulation software known as the Simulated Allocation Model (SAM),
namely the Thoracic Simulated Allocation Model (TSAM). SAM is developed by
the US Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) (SAM, 2017) to
examine the impacts of different organ allocation rules. Prior studies have used
SAM extensively, especially for testing different liver allocation protocols (Shechter
et al., 2005; Wiesner et al., 2001; Harper et al., 2000; Schaubel et al., 2009; Roberts
et al., 2006; Freeman Jr et al., 2004; Gentry et al., 2013). The application of TSAM
to test different heart allocation protocols is limited to evaluating whether under the
2016 Policy there is an improvement on transplant rates and waiting times for the
most severe patients (Israni et al., 2014b). Implications of the 2016 Policy on
geographic disparity have not been evaluated. Such an analysis is warranted since
alleviating geographic disparity is one of the stated objectives of the 2016 Policy.
This is the focus of this research. The TSAM software allowed us to examine
disparities across different geographic levels in the United States (US), namely
across the 111 heart transplant centers (TC) in the US, across the 58 DSA and
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across the 11 UNOS regions.
TABLE 1




Zone A Status 1A
Zone A Status 1B
DSA Status 2
Zone B Status 1A
Zone B Status 1B
Zone A Status 2
Zone B Status 2
TABLE 2
Patient status classification for from 1998 to present and approved in 2016
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
Status 1A Status 1
Status 2
Status 3
Status 1B, with a small
group of status 2
Status 4




Heart allocation scheme for adult candidates approved in 2016 (2016 Policy)
Zone Status
DSA+Zone A Status 1
Zone B Status 1
DSA+Zone A Status 2
Zone B Status 2
DSA Status 3
DSA Status 4
Zone A Status 3
DSA Status 5
Zone B Status 3
DSA Status 6
Zone C Status 1
Zone C Status 2
Zone C Status 3
Zone A Status 4
Zone A Status 5
Zone A Status 6
2 Methods and Materials
2.1 Thoracic Simulation Allocation Model
In this study the Thoracic Simulation Allocation Model (TSAM) was used to
quantify access to heart transplants in the US. TSAM is a simulation software
developed by the US Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) (SAM,
2017). TSAM has the ability to simulate the allocation of hearts to candidates
waiting for heart transplants based on an event-sequenced Monte Carlo technique.
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TSAM has been purposefully designed to serve studies investigating alternative
organ allocation models (Parker et al., 2017). It can use a variety of allocation rules
to determine how a series of thoracic organs would be allocated to a list of potential
recipients under each of the rules considered. The main process of TSAM is to
receive organ arrivals, use the 2014 allocation model rule and match the organ with
potential patients, offer the organ to them and grant the organ to the one who
accepts it. Meanwhile, it tallies patients on the waitlist, deaths on the waitlist, and
discarded organs. The simulation involves two random components to reflect (i) the
uncertainty in a patient’s decision to accept or reject an organ, and (ii) to capture
the uncertainty in the life expectancy of a patient after receiving an organ. TSAM
has its own formulas to evaluate these random components. The built-in input data
covers the two-year study period from July 1, 2009 to July 1, 2011, which
implements the allocation policy as of April 2014. The input files contain patient
arrival, organ arrival, patient waiting list, allocation rule, ABO blood
compatibilities, patient status updates and a few more types of data. Each file has
an extensive amount of medical information for patients which are used as factors in
determining who qualifies for a transplant. After each run, TSAM provides a series
of output files which contain information on graft recipients, discarded organs,
patient death on waitlist, final patient waitlist and a few more types of information.
Patients at least 18 years old were considered in the analysis, with a total of 8,593
candidates. Of these patients, 2,621 candidates were registered at the beginning of
the study period, and 5,972 new candidates arrived during the study period. Among
the patients there were 159 requiring combined heart-lung transplant who were
excluded from the study. The final dataset included a total of 8,434 candidates who
were registered for a diseased donor heart transplant and 3,770 transplant recipients.
TSAM was used to simulate the two allocation scenarios described in Table 1
and Table 3, that is:
1. 2006 Policy: three-tiered patient urgency status and allocation policy as in
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Table 1.
2. 2016 Policy: six-tiered patient urgency status with modified broader sharing
scheme approved in 2016, as in Table 3.
2.2 Statistical Analysis
For each allocation scenario, the following performance measures were
computed for three different geographic levels, namely TC, DSA, and UNOS regions:
1. Median Waiting Time to Transplantation: Median total waiting time among
all the candidates who received a heart for each geographic level considered.
2. Transplant Rate: Ratio between the number of heart transplants performed
and the number of candidates on the waitlist for each geographic level
considered.
3. Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate: Ratio between the number of heart transplant
candidates who died while on the transplant waitlist and the total number of
candidates on the waiting list for each geographic level considered.
4. Average Distance Traveled by Donated Hearts: Average distance traveled by
donated hearts during the study period for each geographic level considered.
The first three are commonly used measures to evaluate the equity aspect of an
organ transplant system (Israni et al., 2014b; Kobashigawa, 2014; Meyer et al.,
2015), while the last measure has a clinical importance since a longer organ transfer
distance is associated with a longer cold ischemia time, which in turn leads to worse
transplant outcomes especially for heart transplants.
To quantify geographic disparity for each performance measure, several
disparity metrics, including Standard Deviation (SD), Mean Square Difference from
the Best Rate (MSBR), Range, and Interquartile Range (IQR) were considered. To
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evaluate whether the geographic disparity among different geographic levels and
under the two policies is statistically significant, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis
test was applied to compare the medians of the measures at the different geographic
levels.
3 Results
3.1 Median Waiting Time to Transplantation
The median waiting time (number of days) is calculated among all the
patients at each geographic level, that is, for each TC, for each DSA, and for each
region. For instance, the median waiting time at each TC (DSA, region) is the
median of the waiting times of all the patients that had a heart transplant in that
TC (DSA, region). Figure 1 shows the boxplots for the distribution of the median
waiting time for each geographic level for both policies. For example, at the TC
level the boxplot represents the distribution of the 111 median waiting times each
computed in one TC in the US. Similarly, at the DSA level the boxplot represents
the distribution of the 58 median waiting times each associated with one of the DSA
in the US. From the boxplots in Figure 5 it can be observed that at the TC level,
the median waiting time varies from 27 to 986 days under the 2006 Policy, and from
9 to 933 days under the 2016 Policy. The median waiting time across DSAs under
the 2006 Policy ranges between 27 and 264 days, and between 14 and 156 days
under the 2016 Policy. Across regions, the median waiting time ranges between 88
and 256 days under the 2006 Policy, and between 39 and 149 days under the 2016
Policy. Table 4 shows the median and average value of the distribution of the
median waiting time at different geographic level. This table shows an improvement
in the median waiting time under the 2016 Policy for each geographic level.
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TABLE 4
Median Waiting Time (days): average and median values at the TC, DSAs and the
region level for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
Average Median Average Median
Region
All 150 143 92 91
Status 1A 39 31 13 7
Status 1B 56 50 36 40
Status 2 150 143 0 0
DSA
All 145 144 89 88
Status 1A 35 30 11 8
Status 1B 61 58 37 34
Status 2 3 0 2 0
TC
All 171 151 110 92
Status 1A 42 34 13 10
Status 1B 71 60 48 34
Status 2 17 0 17 0
Figure 5. Distribution of the median waiting time across different geographic levels
under the 2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy
A quantification of the geographic disparity in the median waiting time
across the different geographic levels can be assessed looking at the results in Table
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5, Figure 6 and Figure 7. Table 5 shows our disparity metrics for the median
waiting time at the TC, DSA, and region levels for different urgency statuses. The
higher the value the higher the geographic disparity. Values in the table show that
both policies suffer from geographic disparity in the median waiting time, however,
geographic disparity is lower under the 2016 Policy. The non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test applied to test the null hypothesis of equality of medians at a
given geographic level (i.e., H0 : m1 =m2 = · · ·=mk, where mi is the median of
group i, and k is the total number of groups in the given level), and under the both
policies. The test revealed that the medians are statistically significantly different at
all levels and under both policies (at the TC level: 2006 Policy: H = 283.1,
P < 0.001, 2016 Policy: H = 421.78, P < 0.001; at the DSA level: 2006 Policy:
H = 150.75, P < 0.001, 2016 Policy: H = 251.48, P < 0.001; and at the region level:
2006 Policy: H = 74.16, P < 0.001, 2016 Policy: H = 141.31, P < 0.001).
Figure 6 displays the mountain plot of the median waiting time under the
two allocation policies across DSAs. The graph shows the cumulative distribution of
the median waiting time across DSAs peaked at the median. The increasing part of
the plot displays the data up to 50th percentile and the decreasing part of the plot
displays the data from the 50th to 100th percentile. A wider mountain denotes
greater disparity of the plotted measure at the DSA level. Using this plot we can
simultaneously evaluate whether the median value of the considered measure has
changed under the two policies (if the two plots are shifted with respect to each
other), and whether the measure shows geographic disparities at the DSA level (a
wider plot reveals greater disparity). It can be observed that, as already revealed by
the results in Figure 5 and Tables 4-5, under the 2016 Policy the median waiting
time and the geographic disparity in the median waiting time across DSAs decrease.
Finally, Figure 7 allows for a visualization of the geographic disparity across DSAs,
as it shows the map of the median waiting time in different DSAs under the 2006
Policy (on the left) and under the 2016 Policy (on the right). Longer median
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TABLE 5
Median Waiting Time: disparity metrics at the TC level, DSA level and region level
for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
SD MSBR Range IQR SD MSBR Range IQR
Region
All 40 73 138 78 28 59 109 39
Status 1A 24 32 77 43 11 14 39 15
Status 1B 25 54 89 44 20 39 62 41
Status 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DSA
All 52 129 237 98 33 81 141 57
Status 1A 28 45 110 56 10 15 44 18
Status 1B 38 72 208 64 25 45 119 47
Status 2 15 15 106 0 7 7 42 0
TC
All 119 187 959 135 110 149 924 84
Status 1A 34 54 160 54 12 18 54 20
Status 1B 65 96 295 94 64 80 558 75
Status 2 95 96 896 4 96 97 896 2
waiting times are represented by darker shades, additionally, a more uniform map
corresponds to less geographic disparity. The map for the 2016 Policy looks lighter
that the map under the 2006 Policy, showing an overall decrease in the median
waiting time. However, both the policies show the same spectrum of shades,
revealing, for example, that the median waiting time is higher in the northern areas
than in the eastern areas of the US. That is, geographic disparity exists under both
the policies and is affecting the same areas.
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Figure 6. Mountain plot for Median Waiting Time
Figure 7. Median Waiting Time (days) across DSAs for the 2006 Policy and the
2016 Policy
3.2 Transplant Rate
Transplant rate in each geographic level is computed as the ratio between the
number of patients who received a transplant and the total number of patients
waiting for a heart transplant at that geographic level. Figure 8 shows the boxplots
of the distribution of the transplant rate for each geographic level under both
policies. The figure shows that at the TC level, transplant rate ranges between 0.04
and 0.52 under the 2006 Policy, and between 0.24 to 1 under the 2016 Policy. The
transplant rate across DSAs under the 2006 Policy ranges between 0.12 and 0.50,
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and between 0.31 and 0.67 under the 2016 Policy. The transplant rate across regions
ranges between 0.18 to 0.34 under the 2006 Policy, and between 0.36 and 0.57 under
the 2016 Policy. Table 6 shows the median and the average of the transplant rates
for different geographic levels. Results in the table reveal that under the 2016 Policy
the median and average transplant rate improve for all geographic levels. Table 7
summarizes the disparity metrics for transplant rates at the TC, DSA, and region
levels for different urgency statuses of the patients while on the waiting list. Each
metric reveals that, under the 2016 Policy, geographic disparity in transplant rate
increases for each status and for each geographic level. Results from the
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that the median values of the transplant
rates at the DSA level are statistically significantly different for both policies. (2006
Policy: H = 72.53, P = 0.02, 2016 Policy: H = 66.75, P = 0.04). On the other hand,
the median values across regions are statistically significantly different under the
2006 Policy (H = 22.02, P = 0.015), while they are not under the 2016 Policy
(H = 17.07, P = 0.07). Figure 9 shows the mountain plot of the distribution of the
transplant rate across DSAs under the current and the 2016 Policy. The graph
shows, that transplant rates improve under the 2016 Policy; however, the mountain
plot under the 2016 Policy is wider than the mountain plot under the 2006 Policy,
revealing an increase in geographic disparity in transplant rate at the DSA level.
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Figure 8. Transplant Rate distribution across different geographic levels under the
current and the 2016 Policy
TABLE 6
Transplant Rate: average and median values at the TC, DSA and region level for
different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
Average Median Average Median
Region
All 0.25 0.25 0.46 0.47
Status 1A 0.61 0.64 0.82 0.82
Status 1B 0.19 0.19 0.52 0.56
Status 2 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05
DSA
All 0.27 0.27 0.49 0.49
Status 1A 0.62 0.64 0.83 0.84
Status 1B 0.23 0.19 0.57 0.58
Status 2 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.04
TC
All 0.27 0.27 0.49 0.47
Status 1A 0.62 0.64 0.80 0.85
Status 1B 0.22 0.18 0.54 0.57
Status 2 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.03
Figure 10 shows the choropleth map of the transplant rate across DSAs under
the 2006 Policy (on the left) and the 2016 Policy (on the right). Higher transplant
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TABLE 7
Median Waiting Time: disparity metrics at the TC level, DSA level and region level
for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
SD MSBR Range IQR SD MSBR Range IQR
Region
All 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.21 0.13
Status 1A 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.46
Status 1B 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.25 0.46 0.24
Status 2 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.20 0.25 0.14
DSA
All 0.08 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.10 0.21 0.36 0.23
Status 1A 0.16 0.41 0.67 0.31 0.16 0.23 1.00 0.18
Status 1B 0.15 0.49 0.67 0.24 0.19 0.47 1.00 0.30
Status 2 0.04 0.23 0.25 0.04 0.13 0.52 0.60 0.15
TC
All 0.11 0.27 0.48 0.21 0.14 0.53 0.76 0.24
Status 1A 0.22 0.44 1.00 0.34 0.21 0.29 1.00 0.21
Status 1B 0.19 0.81 1.00 0.29 0.25 0.53 1.00 0.43
Status 2 0.05 0.36 0.38 0.02 0.12 0.53 0.60 0.15
rates are represented by darker shades. Again, the comparison of the two maps
reveal that under the 2016 Policy there is an overall improvement of the transplant
rate, however, the presence of different shades in both the maps confirms that
geographic disparity is present under both the policies and is affecting the same
areas in the US.
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Figure 9. Mountain plot for Transplant Rate
Figure 10. Transplant Rate across DSAs under the 2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy
3.3 Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate
Pre-transplant mortality rate is computed as the ratio of the number of
patients who died while waiting for a heart to the total number of patients waiting
for a transplant. The pre-transplant mortality rate was computed for each
geographic level. Figure 11 shows the boxplots of the distribution of the
pre-transplant mortality rate computed across each geographic level. At the TC
level, the pre-transplant mortality rate ranges between 0.03 and 0.5 under the 2006
Policy, and between 0.02 and 0.25 under the 2016 Policy. The pre-transplant
mortality rate, across DSAs, ranges between 0.05 and 0.23 under the 2006 Policy,
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and between 0.03 and 0.21 under the 2016 Policy. Among regions, the pre-transplant
mortality rate ranges between 0.08 and 0.14 under the 2006 Policy, and between
0.06 and 0.12 under the 2016 Policy. Table 8 shows the median and average of the
pre-transplant mortality rates for different geographic levels, revealing that the
pre-transplant mortality rate improves in all geographic levels under the 2016 Policy.
Figure 11. Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate distribution across different geographic
levels for the 2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy
Table 9 summarizes the disparity metrics for pre-transplant mortality rate at
the TC, DSA, and region levels for different patient urgency statuses. The values of
the metrics under the 2006 Policy are very similar to the values computed under the
2016 Policy. Results from the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test show that the
median values of the pre-transplant mortality rate across DSAs and across regions
are not statistically significantly different (at the DSA level: 2006 Policy:
H = 52.902, P = 0.326, 2016 Policy: H = 53.57, P = 0.303; at the region level: 2006
Policy: H = 15.51, P = 0.115, 2016 Policy: H = 11.02, P = 0.356). These findings
are also confirmed by the mountain plots in Figure 12.
Figure 13 shows the choropleth maps of the pre-transplant mortality rate
under the 2006 Policy (on the left) and the 2016 Policy (on the right). Higher values
are represented by darker shades. Both the maps are in line with the Kruskal-Wallis
test: the pre-transplant mortality rate does not show a wide variation across DSAs.
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TABLE 8
Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate: average and median values at the TC, DSA and
region level for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
Average Median Average Median
Region
All 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09
Status 1A 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
Status 1B 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Status 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
DSA
All 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09
Status 1A 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.01
Status 1B 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Status 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
TC
All 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10
Status 1A 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00
Status 1B 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00
Status 2 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00
Figure 12. Mountain plot for Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate
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TABLE 9
Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate: disparity metrics at the TC, DSAs and the region
level for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
SD MSBR Range IQR SD MSBR Range IQR
Region
All 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04
Status 1A 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04
Status 1B 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04
Status 2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
DSA
All 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.06
Status 1A 0.07 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.25 0.07
Status 1B 0.07 0.08 0.50 0.06 0.04 0.22 0.25 0.05
Status 2 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.20 0.67 0.03
TC
All 0.07 0.14 0.48 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.48 0.07
Status 1A 0.06 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.33 0.04
Status 1B 0.11 0.13 1.00 0.08 0.10 0.11 1.00 0.07
Status 2 0.12 0.13 1.00 0.06 0.11 0.17 1.00 0.04
Figure 13. Pre-Transplant Mortality Rate across DSAs under the 2006 Policy and
the 2016 Policy
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3.4 Average Distance Traveled by Donated Hearts
Average distance traveled by a donated organ was computed at the TC,
DSAs and the UNOS region level. Figure 14 shows the boxplots of the distribution
of the average distance for each geographic level. At the TC level the average
distance ranges between 0 and 412 miles under the 2006 Policy, and between 7 and
691 miles under the 2016 Policy. At the DSA level, the average distance ranges
between 7 and 397 miles under the 2006 Policy, and between 8 and 415 miles under
the 2016 Policy. At the region level, the average distance ranges between 139 and
346 miles under the 2006 Policy, and between 139 and 333 miles under the 2016
Policy. Table 10 shows the median and average values of the average distance
traveled by donated hearts for different geographic levels. This table shows the
average distance traveled by donated hearts increases under the 2016 Policy.
Figure 14. Average Distance distribution across different geographic levels for the
2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy
Table 11 summarizes the disparity metrics for the average distance traveled
by donated hearts at the TC, DSA, and region levels for different urgency statuses
of the patients while on the waiting list. The disparity metrics reveal that
geographic disparity increases with the 2016 Policy for all geographic levels and for
all patients statuses (except status 1A patients). Results from the Kruskal-Wallis
test show that median values of the average distance traveled by donated hearts
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TABLE 10
Average Distance Traveled by Donated Hearts: average and median values at the TC,
DSAs and the region level for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
Average Median Average Median
Region
All 210 197 221 207
Status 1A 219 211 228 227
Status 1B 180 163 183 164
Status 2 405 387 377 335
DSA
All 198 189 205 205
Status 1A 219 204 230 217
Status 1B 169 156 167 165
Status 2 378 343 394 270
TC
All 193 189 219 199
Status 1A 210 203 226 219
Status 1B 170 147 178 158
Status 2 354 243 350 262
across the different geographic levels are statistically significantly different under
both the policies (at the TC level: 2006 Policy: H = 355.33, P < 0.001, 2016 Policy:
H = 348.51, P < 0.001; at the DSA level: 2006 Policy: H = 266.24, P < 0.001, 2016
Policy: H = 262.16, P < 0.001; and at the region level: 2006 Policy: H = 86.13,
P < 0.001, 2016 Policy: H = 92.8, P < 0.001).
These findings are confirmed by the mountain plots in Figure 15. The wide
interquartile range in both the mountain plots reveals the presence of geographic
disparity under both policies, and since the plot corresponding to the 2016 Policy is
shifted to the right, this reveals an increase of the distance under the 2016 Policy.
Figure 16 shows the choropleth maps of the average distance traveled by
donated hearts at the DSA level under the 2006 Policy (on the left) and the 2016
Policy (on the right). Longer distances are represented by darker shades. The map
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TABLE 11
Average Distance Traveled by Donated Hearts: disparity metrics at the TC, DSAs,
and region level for different urgency statuses while on the waiting list
2006 Policy 2016 Policy
SD MSBR Range IQR SD MSBR Range IQR
Region
All 58 89 207 92 60 101 195 122
Status 1A 59 88 214 89 51 93 177 92
Status 1B 72 96 252 105 67 124 248 116
Status 2 207 345 706 385 209 286 681 361
DSA
All 77 206 391 118 73 211 408 97
Status 1A 80 222 431 109 70 145 289 126
Status 1B 85 183 441 97 84 171 381 142
Status 2 287 402 1044 576 356 402 1727 459
TC
All 87 212 412 138 105 236 684 136
Status 1A 95 226 440 150 113 245 766 174
Status 1B 122 195 736 176 117 202 561 192
Status 2 294 343 1450 352 295 346 1730 286
on the right is overall darker revealing and increase in the average distance traveled
by donated hearts under the 2016 Policy. The variation in color in both maps shows
that geographic disparity exists under both policies.
Figure 15. Mountain plot for Average Distance Traveled by Donated Organs
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Figure 16. Average Distance (miles) Traveled by Donated Hearts across DSAs under
the 2006 Policy and the 2016 Policy
4 Conclusion
The heart transplant community has been concerned about high mortality on
the transplant wait list. In response to this concern, the Thoracic Organ
Transplantation Committee under UNOS approved a different policy for heart
allocation in December 2016. While prior literature investigated the overall impact
of the 2016 Policy using TSAM (Colvin et al., 2016), implications of the 2016 Policy
on geographic disparity have not been evaluated. Such an analysis is warranted since
alleviating geographic disparity is one of the stated objectives of the 2016 Policy.
The present study performed a simulation analysis to assess the impacts of
the 2016 Policy using an existing simulation software, the Thoracic Simulation
Allocation Model (TSAM). The main objective of the analysis was to investigate the
impact of the 2016 Policy on geographic disparity measured by four performance
indicators: i) access to transplant; ii) waiting time before a transplant; iii)
pre-transplant mortality rate; and iv) distance traveled by donated hearts.
The degree of dispersion around the mean performance indicators was large,
providing inconclusive results depending on the dispersion measure employed (i.e.,
SD, MSBR, Range, and IQR). While the predicted size of disparity remains
uncertain, our results overall demonstrated that, the geographic disparity will likely
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remain the same with the exception of the waiting time for a transplant. For the
waiting time, the results indicated rather consistent reduction in geographic
disparity, particularly for the Status 1 patients. The disparity in transplant rate was
also improved for the Status 1 patients, although this improvement was achieved by
the concomitant reduction in geographic equity among other non-urgent patients.
For pre-transplant mortality rate and heart transfer distance, the disparity measures
were similar for the two policies.
The 2016 Policy appears to achieve the main goal, i.e., reduced
pre-transplant mortality rate. The reduction was seen most significantly among the
Status 1 patients (63%). With broader sharing, average heart transfer distance
increased at all levels (increase by 13%, 4%, and 5% at the TC, DSA, and region
levels, respectively). The predicted increase was between 7 and 26 miles. Thus,
negative impacts of the associated increase in the time between donor-heart
retrieval and the transplant (i.e., cold ischemia time) on the likelihood of graft
failure or delayed graft function would be negligible. The simulation also showed an
expected increase in transplant rate stemming from the increased level of heart
utilization. The waiting time was also reduced at all geographic levels (39%, 38%,
and 36% for regions, DSA, and TC levels, respectively). In summary, access to a
heart transplant is likely to improve as a result of the 2016 Policy implementation.
The 2016 Policy benefits urgent patients in particular, as intended in the 2016
Policy formulation. However, the improvement in geographic equity will remain
modest despite it being one of the expected outcomes of the 2016 Policy.
Given the persistent nature of the geographic disparity, a more targeted
approach may be necessary to achieve geographic equity in access to transplants.
On the open discussion boards regarding the new changes in heart allocation policy,
some advocated for varying geographic sharing depending on the population density
of DSAs and regions. Designing a broader sharing scheme by taking population
density into account with an explicit objective to minimize geographic disparity
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among DSAs or regions could be an effective approach in achieving geographic
equity. In Chapter III we will present an optimization model to address geographic
disparity in heart allocation system.
Several limitations to our analysis should be noted. First and foremost, there
is no defined index in measuring geographic disparity. Our analysis used the metrics
that are currently under consideration including the range between the worst and
the best location, standard deviation, and the squared average differences from the
best location, which gives quantitative results in measuring the disparity. Further
exploration and testing to identify adequate metrics and pros and cons of each
metric are warranted. The other limitation comes from our use of TSAM in
generating simulated data. TSAM uses all patients in the built-in input file in the
simulation and does not randomize the patients included in each simulation run.
The simulation outputs are deterministic in this sense, limiting the ability to
perform further statistical assessment of our simulation outputs using some
conventional interval estimates such as confidence intervals (Torlak et al., 2016).
The other limitation of TSAM is that it uses an old patient cohort (2009-2011)
which might not reflect recent changes in health conditions and demographics.
Despite such limitations, the findings of our simulation analysis were fairly
consistent in demonstrating the persistent geographic disparity in access to heart
transplants, indicating the need for a more direct, targeted effort to reduce disparity.
B Transplant Outcome of Adult Heart Donor with Prior Quality-based
Offer Refusal
There is a donor organ shortage for all transplant organs, including heart, in
the United States. Transplantation rates are limited by a shortage of heart donors.
Every year nearly 3,000 people per year either die on the transplant waiting list or
are removed from the list after waiting so long that they have became too sick to
undergo transplant surgery (OPTN, 2018). Despite the increase in the number of
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donated heart organ by 30% from 2003 to 2007 (Tuttle-Newhall et al., 2009), the
number of performed heart transplants over the past two decades has remained
steady between 2,000 to 2,500 being performed annually (Kilic et al., 2014). The
organ shortage is magnified because many hearts are discarded because of strict
selection criteria and concern for regulatory reprimand for less than optimal
post-transplant outcomes (Kobashigawa et al., 2017). Only one in three available
donor hearts is currently accepted for transplantation, which greatly limits heart
transplant rates nationwide (Khush et al., 2015). A study on organ utilization in
the U.S. in 2004 reports that 35.8% of potential diseased heart organs were not
recovered because of medical contraindication that was not evident prior to consent
or lack of organ viability detected by testing or intraoperatively. Many reasons exist
for discarding donor hearts, including demographic and clinical factors (e.g. older
age, small size) and co-morbidities (hypertension, diabetes) (Khush et al., 2013).
A study (Khush et al., 2015) closely examined national trends in donor heart
acceptance and variation across geographical regions, which shows that organ
utilization varies between regions. This variation in organ utilization among regions
magnified geographic disparity in access to heart transplants across regions.
In this part of this chapter as a solution to reduce geographic disparity in
access to heart transplant, we aim to quantify the geographic disparity in offer heart
refusals across OPOs. For improving the organ utilization, we want to answer this
question: Are discarded hearts really are not usable (i.e., have worse outcomes)? For
this purpose, we closely examined the transplant outcome from transplanted hearts
that have been refused one or more times by transplant centers. We compared these
results with transplant outcome from transplanted hearts with no prior offer
refusals. In the following we discuss the method and the results for our analysis.
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1 Study Population
For this study we used UNOS data on hearts organ from 2003 to 2015.
During this study period 22,338 heart transplant were performed (excluding
candidates with age <18, candidates with combined organs need and candidates
with re-transplant) and 16,875 hearts have been discarded. The final data set on
transplanted hearts after excluding missing data, contains 19,078 transplanted
hearts. Among all the transplanted hearts, 13,059 (58% ) were transplanted without
any previous quality-based refusal and 9,279 (42% ) were transplanted with at least
one quality-based offer refusal. Table 12 shows the number and percentage of hearts
on different values of offer refusal rate. For example, 4,796 (52%) of hearts have
been refused between 1 to 5 times by transplant centers before being accepted by a
candidate for transplantation.
TABLE 12
Offer refusal rate among transplanted hearts
1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 > 30
Number of Hearts 4,796 1,413 1,283 599 1,185
Percentage of Hearts 52% 15% 14% 6% 13%
2 Geographic Disparity in Offer Heart Refusal
In this section we want to examine if the rate of offer heart refusal varies
between different OPOs. For each OPO we calculated the total number of hearts
that has been offered to a transplant center in that OPO and the number of offers
that have been refused by a transplant center in that OPO. The offer refusal rate
for each OPO is: the number of offers that has been refused divided by total
number of offer. Figure 17 shows the offer refusal rate in each OPO. The offer
refusal rate ranges between 0.16 to 0.45. The variation in color shade in the map
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displays geographic disparity in offer heart refusal among OPOs.
Figure 17. Offer heart refusal rate in each OPO
3 Discarded Hearts Rate
Analyzing UNOS data shows that the percentage of discarded hearts
increases from 2003 to 2006, and from 2007 this number starts decreasing (Figure
18). This graph shows that over the last 12 years the percentage of discarded hearts
have been always greater than 35%. 37% of the discarded hearts (6,809 hearts) have
been refused less than 10 times by transplant centers before being discarded. Figure
19 shows that, for example, 7% of the donated hearts (486 hearts) have been
discarded without being offer to any patient and 14% of discarded hearts have been
refused by just 1 transplant center before being discarded.
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Figure 18. Percentage of transplanted vs. discarded organ hearts by year
Figure 19. Discarded organ hearts by number of quality-based offer refusals
4 Transplant Outcome for Hearts with Prior Offer Refusal
the results from previous sections show that a great percentage of hearts have
been discarded in each year, where 37% of these hearts have been refused for less
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than 10 times before being discarded. The geographic disparity in offer refusal rate
across OPOs creates a need to analyze if these discarded hearts have worse
outcome. In these section we analyze the transplant outcome from the hearts with
previous offer refusal by using the transplanted hearts data from 2003 to 2015.
4.1 Statistical Analysis
We performed a t-test to check if the donors and the transplant centers
characteristics are statistically significantly different for transplanted hearts with no
prior quality-based refusal and hearts with at least one prior quality-based refusal.
Results were considered significant if the p-value was less than 0.05. All reported
p-values were two-sided.
We performed a multivariate cox regression analysis to adjust all the
covariates listed in Table 13. We used a comprehensive list of risk factors, including
cold ischemia time, local donors, number of prior transplants, HLA mismatch level,
male recipient, male donor, recipient age>44, donor age>30, African American
donors, and the number of times that a heart has been rejected before
transplantation, as the independent variables. Patient death was the dependent
variable. The percentage of missing value for HLA mismatch level was 13% and for
all other variables was below 3%. For the purpose of analysis, we deleted all the
instances that contains missing values. 90-days, 1-year, and 3-years post-transplant
survival were calculated using Kaplan-Meier analysis. The primary outcome
measure was patient death. For this analysis, time to death was assessed as time
from the time of transplant to the time of death. Patients lost to follow-up or alive
on December 31, 2015, were censored at the date of last know follow-up.
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TABLE 13
Transplant center and donor demographic for transplanted hearts with offer refusal






Age > 50, n(%) 640 (5%) 1,364 (14%) <0.001
Male, n(%) 9,951 (76%) 6,009 (64%) <0.001
Race, n(%)
White 8,428 (64%) 6,199 (66%) <0.001
African American 1,926 (14%) 1,449 (15%) 0.074
Hispanic 2,313 (17%) 1,375 (14%) <0.001
Asian 215 (1.6%) 154 (1.7%) 0.939
History of hypertension, n(%) 1,246 (9%) 1,836 (19%) <0.001
ECD donor, n(%) 216 (1.6%) 510 (5.5%) <0.001
Cause of Death, n(%)
Anoxia 1,480 (11%) 2,304 (24%) <0.001
Cerebrovascular/Stroke 2,485 (19%) 2,550 (27%) <0.001
Head trauma 8,805 (67%) 4,083 (44%) <0.001
CNS tumor 71 (0.54%) 105 (1.1%) <0.001
Unknown 216 (1.7%) 237 (2.6%) <0.001
Share type, n (%)
Local 9,900 (75%) 3,730 (40%) <0.001
Regional 1,609 (12%) 1,925 (20%) <0.001
National 1,540 (11%) 3,621 (39%) <0.001
Cold ischemia time (hrs), mean 3.07 3.42 <0.001
Transfer distance (mile), mean 124.8 243.6 <0.001
HLA mismatch level, mean 4.62 4.62 0.933
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4.2 Results
Multivariate Cox Regression Analysis of Graft Failure Table 14 shows the
multivariate Cox regression analysis of graft failure. The results from cox regression
help in recognizing the factors that effect graft failure. The most important point
taken from the Table 14 is that hearts that previously have been refused between
1-5 times (HR=1.041, p=0.119) and between 6-10 times (1.088, p=0.167) did not
have a higher risk of graft failure.
Regarding the factors that impact graft survival; in terms of year of the
transplant, the transplant recipients who received a transplant in years 2003
(HR=1.095, p=0.048), 2006 (HR=1.107, p=0.018), 2010 (HR=0.870, p=0.009),
2011 (HR=0.854, p=0.007) and 2013 (HR=0.859, p=0.024) had a higher risk of
graft failure. The recipients with a prior history of transplant had a decreased
long-term transplant survival (HR=1.291, p<0.001). HLA mismatch level has
significant effect on graft failure (HR=1.032, p=0.011). Donor heart cold ischemia
time and local donor were the major factors (HR = 1.094, p<0.001 and HR=1.114,
p=0.001). Older recipients (>44) were associated with a higher risk of graft failure
(HR = 0.927, p < 0.001). Donor age >30 years also was a primary significant factor
affecting long term survival (HR = 1.207, p<0.001). Finally, for number of quality
based refusals, grafts with 11 to 20 previous offer refusals (HR=1.205, p=0.004), 21
to 30 previous offer refusals (HR=1.242, p=0.018) and more than 30 previous offer
refusal (HR=1.207, p=0.011) had higher risk of graft failure.
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TABLE 14




Transplant year: 2003 1.095 (1.000-1.199) 0.048
Transplant year: 2006 1.107 (1.017-1.205) 0.018
Transplant year: 2010 0.870 (0.784-0.967) 0.009
Transplant year: 2011 0.854 (0.762-0.957) 0.00
Transplant year: 2013 0.859 (0.753-0.980) 0.024
Cold ischemic time 1.094 (1.065-1.124) <0.001
Local donor 1.114 (1.045-1.186) 0.001
Number of previous transplants 1.291 (1.177-1.416) <0.001
HLA mismatch level 1.032 (1.007-1.057) 0.011
Male recipient 0.941 (0.884-1.001) 0.054
Male donor 0.992 (0.934-1.053) 0.795
Recipient age >44 0.923 (0.871-0.979) 0.008
Donor age >30 1.250 (1.182-1.323) <0.001
African American donor 1.059 (0.985-1.138) 0.119
Number of refusals: 1-5 1.042 (0.971-1.118) 0.248
Number of refusals: 6-10 1.088 (0.965-1.226) 0.167
Number of refusals: 11-20 1.205 (1.063-1.366) 0.004
Number of refusals: 21-30 1.242 (1.038-1.486) 0.018
Number of refusals: above 30 1.207 (1.043-1.384) 0.011
Multivariate Cox Regression Analysis of Patient Failure In this section by
using multivariate cox regression we want to recognize the factors that effect patient
failure. Table 15 shows the multivariate Cox regression analysis of post-transplant
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mortality risk. Important point taken from Table 15 is that grafts with 1-5 prior
offer refusals does not have higher risk of patient failure (HR=1.075, p=0.064).
Regarding the factors that impact patient survival; in terms of year of
transplant, the transplant recipients who received a transplant in 2011 (HR=0.847,
p=0.009) had a higher risk of failure. Donor heart cold ischemia time and local
donor were the major factors (HR = 1.091, p<0.001 and HR=1.092, p=0.011). The
recipients with a previous transplant had a decreased transplant survival
(HR=1.272, p<0.001). HLA mismatch level has significant effect on patient survival
(HR=1.026, p=0.050). Older recipients (>44) were associated with a higher risk of
failure (HR = 0.927, p = 0.025). Donor age >30 years also was a primary significant
factor affecting long term survival (HR = 1.207, p<0.001). Finally, for number of
quality based refusals, recipients of grafts with 6 to 10 previous offer refusals
(HR=1.141, p=0.036), 11 to 20 previous offer refusals (HR=1.256, p=0.001), 21 to
30 previous offer refusal (HR=1.321, p=0.002) and more than 30 previous offer
refusal (HR=1.231, p=0.004) had higher risk of mortality.
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TABLE 15




Transplant year: 2003 1.086 (0.986-1.197) 0.092
Transplant year: 2006 1.093 (0.998-1.198) 0.055
Transplant year: 2010 0.906 (0.811-1.014) 0.087
Transplant year: 2011 0.847 (0.748-0.958) 0.009
Transplant year: 2013 0.915 (0.796-1.053) 0.217
Cold ischemic time 1.091 (1.059-1.124) <0.001
Local donor 1.092 (1.020-1.170) 0.011
Number of previous transplant 1.272 (1.142-1.414) <0.001
HLA mismatch level 1.026 (1.000-1.053) 0.050
Male recipient 0.966 (0.902-1.035) 0.336
Male donor 0.965 (0.903-1.031) 0.299
Recipient age >44 0.927 (0.867-0.990) 0.025
Donor age >30 1.207 (1.139-1.280) <0.001
African American donor 1.069 (0.988-1.156) 0.097
Number of refusal: 1-5 1.075 (0.995-1.161) 0.064
Number of refusal: 6-10 1.141 (1.008-1.294) 0.036
Number of refusal: 11-20 1.256 (1.104-1.428) 0.001
Number of refusal: 21-30 1.321 (1.104-1.581) 0.002
Number of refusal: above 30 1.231 (1.066-1.421) 0.004
Survival Analysis to Graft Failure Using Kaplan-Meier analysis we compared
the transplant outcome for 90-day 1- and 3-year for the transplanted hearts with
prior offer refusal and hearts with no prior offer refusal. In general, among the
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26,563 transplanted grafts 40% of them (10,681 grafts) had at least one previous
quality-based offer refusal. The 90-days survival was similar among cohorts
independent of grafts, at 94% for the grafts with no previous offer refusal compared
to 93% with at least one quality based offer refusal. The 1-year survival was also
similar at 89% with no quality based offer refusal and 88% with at least one quality
based offer refusal. 3-year survival for transplanted grafts with no quality based
offer refusal is 82% and for grafts with at least one quality based offer refusal is 80%
(Figure 20). The 90-day, 1- and 3-year survival are displayed in Table 16. Figure 21
shows the 3-year survival curve for transplanted hearts with different number of
prior offer refusal. This figure shows that the survival curve for the hearts with 1-5
and 6-10 prior offer refusals is very close to the survival curve for the hearts with no
prior offer refusal.
TABLE 16








Number of refusals: 0 94 89 82
Number of refusals: 1-5 93 88 81
Number of refusals: 6-10 92 89 82
Number of refusals: 11-20 91 87 79
Number of refusals: 21-30 92 87 78
Number of refusals: above 30 93 88 79
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Figure 20. Kaplan–Meier analysis demonstrating cumulative survival rate for grafts
with no previous quality based offer refusal and grafts with at least one previous
quality based offer refusal and (log rank, p<0.001)
Figure 21. Kaplan–Meier analysis demonstrating cumulative survival rate for grafts
stratified by the number of previous quality-based offer refusals (log rank, p<0.001)
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5 Conclusion
One of the main causes of the geographic disparity is the uneven distribution
of supply and demand across the country. The gap between supply and demand
become even larger because of the variability in organ usage rate, organ waste and
other factors which influence the effective use of donated organs (Mathur et al.,
2010). Our analysis showed that disparity in offer refusal rate exists among OPOs
and it ranged from 0.16 to 0.45. To deal with the widening gap between supply and
demand for heart transplants, researchers have suggested to increase the donor pool
by using sub-optimal heart organs.
The main focus of our study was to analyze weather the discarded organs
have worse outcome and weather we can use a percentage of these organs to increase
access to heart transplants. To do so, we analyzed the transplant outcome from
grafts with prior offer refusal and compared their outcome to grafts with no
previous offer refusals. We used cox regression to analyze if these two groups of
grafts, statistically, have different outcome in terms of graft and patient failure. The
results from our cox regression indicated that grafts with 1-10 times prior offer
refusals did not have different outcomes from the grafts with no prior offer refusal
(p-value>0.036). Additionally, the results from Kaplan-Meier analysis indicated
that organs with 1-10 times prior offer refusal have the same 3-year transplant
outcome (81%). It should be noted that from 16,875 discarded hearts, 6,809 (40%)
of them have been refused less than 10 times by transplant centers.
The variation in organ utilization across the country causes an unbalanced
distribution of supply and demand, which ultimately can cause geographic disparity
in access to heart transplants. Regions with higher offer refusals reject most offers
and wasting a great percentage of their supply for organs. Our analyze indicated
that a great percentage (potentially 40%) of hearts that have been discarded under
current practice could have been utilized without compromising transplant outcome.
47
CHAPTER III
OPTIMIZATION MODEL TO ADDRESS GEOGRAPHIC
DISPARITY IN ACCESS TO HEART TRANSPLANTS
A Introduction
Heart failure is a growing health problem affecting nearly 6 million people in
the United States (Go et al., 2013a), with approximately 200,000 patients suffering
from a progressed to end-stage or Stage D heart disease (AFZAL AMMAR et al.,
2007). Heart transplantation is the definitive therapy for end-stage heart disease
patients. For the patients who underwent a heart transplant from 2007 through
2009, the 1-year survival rate was 88.8%, while the 3-year and 5-year survival rates
were 82% and 76%, respectively (Colvin-Adams et al., 2014). In the United States,
organ allocations for transplantation have been administered by the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS). UNOS established the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN) in 1984 to coordinate across 58 Organ
Procurement Organizations (OPOs) which are grouped into 11 regions. Each of
these OPOs is responsible for acquiring and distributing organs procured within
their service area which is known as the Donor Service Area (DSA). OPTN’s
mission is to ensure a fair and equitable allocation of organs.
Organ allocation protocols vary depending on the organ type. A guiding
principle for heart allocation is to prioritize those in greatest need within an
acceptable geographic distance. The typical set of zones is defined through
increasing concentric circles (see Figure 22) with radii of 250 miles (Local), 500
miles (Zone A), 1,000 miles (Zone B), 1,500 miles (Zone C), 2,500 miles (Zone D),
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and outside 2,500 miles (Zone E). Thus, transplant candidates registered at the
transplant centers located within the donor hospital’s local area receive offers first,
followed by the candidates at the transplant centers in the successive zones.
Figure 22. Current homogeneous zonal structure composed of six zones around donor
hospitals in the heart allocation system.
Prior studies have reported various disparities in access to heart transplants.
In particular, disparity associated with patient locations (geographic disparity) has
been identified as an issue in the current allocation system (Kobashigawa, 2014;
Singh et al., 2014). Another study showed that the number of transplants
performed on higher urgency candidates varies significantly from 37% to 86% across
geographic regions (Meyer et al., 2015). This is contrary to the founding principles
of OPTN, which focus on recipient chance equality.
In 2016 the OPTN charged its Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee
with proposing changes to the 2006 allocation system. The new policy took effect in
October 2018. Despite the known geographic disparity in the system, the majority
of the proposed changes in the heart allocation policy focused on the prioritization
of transplant candidates according to their severity status, rather than geographic
factors (Kobashigawa, 2014; Singh et al., 2014; OPTN, 2016; Fudim, 2019). The
new policy groups adult recipients (age ≥ 18) into six severity statuses (status 1 to
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6, with status 1 corresponding to the most severe patients) in contrast with the
three severity levels of the previous policy (status 1A, status 1B, and status 2).
Additionally, the newly approved heart allocation policy altered the sequence of
allocation for the most urgent adult candidates by so-called broader sharing: hearts
from deceased donors age 18 years or older will be offered first to compatible adult
status 1 and pediatric (age < 18) status 1A candidates within a 500 mile radius
from the donor hospital, then to compatible adult status 2 candidates within a 500
mile radius. If no matches are made for these candidates, hearts will be offered to
the candidates in lower urgency statuses within a 250 mile radius (OPTN, 2016;
Fudim, 2019).
In a previous study (Karami et al., 2019), which is presented in ChapterII, we
showed that geographic disparity in access to heart transplants is likely to persist
with the new policy. Additionally, the transplant community has voiced a number of
concerns regarding the new heart allocation proposal (OPTN, 2016). The main
concern is that the new allocation policy might not be sufficient to reduce
geographic disparity in access to heart transplants, because the current zonal
structure is homogeneous across donor hospitals and does not take into account the
regional heterogeneity of transplant centers and of population density. In this
context, a heterogeneous zonal structure has been suggested as a possible solution to
overcome these limits (OPTN, 2016). A heterogeneous zonal structure would allow
each donor hospital to have a different number of zones with different radii.
In light of this, we proposed a novel mathematical optimization model to
formulate the Boundary Allocation Problem (BAP) to assign different zonal
structures to donor hospitals and minimize geographic disparity in access to heart
transplants across transplant centers. In our analysis we aimed to answer the
following questions:
1. How much does a heterogeneous zonal structure reduce geographic disparity in
access to heart transplants?
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2. How much does a heterogeneous zonal structure change the average distance
traveled by organs?
3. How heterogeneous should the zonal structure around donor hospitals be to
minimize geographic disparity?
4. How robust is a heterogeneous zonal structure with respect to changes in
supply and demand over time?
Although mathematical optimization is recognized as an important tool in decision
making to address geographic disparity in the allocation system of other organs
(Zenios et al., 2000; Stahl et al., 2005; Kong et al., 2010; Demirci et al., 2012;
Gentry et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2015; Ata et al., 2016), a mathematical
optimization approach to address geographic disparity in the heart allocation
system has not been explored yet, and to the best of our knowledge this is the first
attempt in this direction. The only existing study is by Hasankhani and Khademi
(2017), who used a simulation model to evaluate alternative allocation systems to
reduce geographic disparity in access to heart transplants. They evaluated three
different strategies; (i) combining the three immediate zones in the current
homogeneous zonal structure into one zone, (ii) altering the prioritization across
patients’ medical status, and (iii) giving higher priority to patients with longer
waiting times. What makes our study different is that we use an optimization model
to design the heterogeneous zonal structure as opposed to the aforementioned study,
which arbitrary combined the zones in the current homogeneous zonal structure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
formally define the Boundary Allocation Problem. The mathematical formulation is
provided in Section C. Our experimental design is described in Section E, and
results are presented in Section F. Finally, in Section H and I we further discuss the
results and limitations of our study, as well as possible next steps.
51
B Problem Definition
In this section, we formally define the Boundary Allocation Problem. The
definition of zones, zonal structure, access level, and access level disparity is
provided first.
1 Zonal Structure Definition
Let H = {1,2, . . . ,m} denote the set of m donor hospitals, and
T = {1,2, . . . ,n} the set of n transplant centers. Let C ={ c0, c1, . . . , cq} be a set of q
predefined concentric circles around a donor hospital, such that circle cs is included
in circle ck for each s < k, and c0 is corresponding to the point in the center of the
innermost circle. We denote the corresponding index set as C = {0,1,2, . . . , q}. As
an example consider Figure 23 which shows donor hospital j, with four predefined
concentric circles C ={c0,c1,c2,c3}.
Figure 23. Set of four predefined circles around a donor hospital.
We define a zone as the area between an ordered pair of circles, and a zonal
structure as a collection of contiguous zones associated with a given donor hospital.
Formally:
DEFINITION 1 A zone z around a donor hospital is an ordered pair of circles,
i.e., z = (cs, ck), s < k, where cs is the inner circle of the zone, and ck is the outer
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circle of the zone.
DEFINITION 2 A zonal structure of a donor hospital j ∈H is a collection
{z1j , z2j , . . . , z`j} of ` zones associated with the donor hospital.
DEFINITION 3 The innermost zone z1 is defined by pairing the fictitious circle
c0 with another predefined circle cs, i.e., z1 = (c0, cs), s 6= 0 and s≤ q− `+ 1. A
proper zonal structure around each donor hospital must be composed of contiguous
zones:
DEFINITION 4 A zonal structure {z1j , z2j , . . . , z`j} around donor hospital j ∈H
is contiguous if the outer circle of zij coincides with the inner circle of zi+1j ,
∀i= 1, . . . , `−1. Going back to our example, assume that by selecting from a
predefined set of four circles (Figure 23) we want to design a zonal structure around
donor hospital j which is composed of two zones, i.e., {z1j , z2j}. Figure 24 shows
the possible zonal structures. For example, if z1j is defined as the area between c0
and c1, then the outer circle of z1j is c1. In this case, z2j , can be defined as either
the area between c1 and c2 (dark grey area in Figure 24(a)), or the area between c1
and c3 (dark grey area in Figure 24(b)). Note that z2j cannot be defined as the area
between c2 and c3, since z1j and z2j would not be contiguous. On the other hand, if
z1j is defined as the area between circle c0 and c2 (light grey area in Figure 24(c)),
then the only possible configuration for z2j would be the area between c2 and c3
(dark grey area in Figure 24(c)).
2 Access Level
Transplant rate (Stewart et al., 2018), waiting time (Davis et al., 2015), and
supply to demand ratio (Reese et al., 2014; Lewis et al., 2014; Haugen et al., 2019)
were commonly used by other researchers for measuring geographic disparity in
access to organ transplants. In particular, geographic disparity in access to
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Figure 24. Possible 2 zones drawn from 3 concentric circles around donor hospital j.
transplants has been associated with supply to demand ratio disparity (Stewart
et al., 2018), and it is a valid metric in measuring geographic disparity (Rana et al.,
2015). Additionally, one study showed that supply to demand ratio is aligned with
waiting time, that is, waiting time is lower in the transplant centers with a greater
supply to demand ratio (Reese et al., 2014). We define access level as a function of
supply to demand ratio, and of the distance between supply and demand locations.
Our access level metric can be interpreted as transplant rate, since demand is the
number of waitlist candidates and supply is the number of recovered hearts that
have been transplanted.
In this section we explain how access level is defined. Given a proper zonal
structure {z1j , z2j , . . . , z`j} around each donor hospital j ∈H, we quantify the access
level At of a given transplant center t ∈ T as a function of the ratio of the total
available supply for t and the total demand at t. Let sj denote the supply at donor
hospital j, and dt denote the demand at transplant center t. The set
Z = {1,2, . . . , `} denotes the index set of the zones in the zonal structure. We use
notation T (h,j)⊆ T to denote the set of transplant centers in zone h around donor
hospital j. We consider the supply sj to be available for transplant center t, if t is,
included in one of the zones assigned to the donor hospital j, that is, if there exists
h ∈ Z such that t ∈ T (h,j):
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DEFINITION 5 A donor hospital j is associated with a transplant center t, if
one of its zones contains t, i.e., there exists h ∈ Z such that t ∈ T (h,j).
DEFINITION 6 The set of donor hospitals associated with a given transplant
center t is denoted by H(t), i.e., H(t) = {j ∈H : ∃h ∈ Z s.t. t ∈ T (h,j)}.
DEFINITION 7 The available supply for a transplant center t is the sum of the
supplies of all the donor hospitals associated with t, i.e., ∑j∈H(t) sj .
Let us consider the simple example in Figure 25 with two donor hospitals
{j1, j2}, three transplant centers {t1, t2, t3}, and two zones around each donor
hospital. Transplant center t1 is located in the first zone of donor hospital j1, and
the second zone around donor hospital j2. Transplant center t2 is located in the
second zone of donor hospital j1, and transplant center t3 is in the first zone of
donor hospital j2. Hence, H(t1) = {j1, j2}, and the available supply for t1 is
sj1 + sj2 ; H(t2) = {j1}, and the available supply for t2 is sj1 ; and, finally,
H(t3) = {j2}, and the available supply for t2 is sj2 .
Note that, since the zonal structure of a given donor hospital may contain
multiple transplant centers, the supply in the donor hospital should be shared across
transplant centers. Additionally, since distance between a transplant center and a
donor hospital plays an important role in the heart allocation system (i.e., lower the
distance, the better the access (Axelrod et al., 2010)), then, for defining the access
level of each transplant center, two important factors should be considered: (i) the
distance between a transplant center and the associated donor hospitals and (ii) the
shared portion of the available supply, which depends on the number of transplant
centers with which the supply of a given donor hospital needs to be shared and the
corresponding level of demand (a transplant center with a greater demand is
allocated a greater portion of supply).
To account for these two factors, we assign a weight wh to each zone h around
donor hospital j, such that inner zones have a greater weight (i.e., wh ≥ wk, for
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h < k), and we consider the demand for transplant centers which are associated with
that donor hospital. Going back to the example in Figure 25, supply sj1 is shared
between t1 and t2, with t1 belonging to the first zone and t2 belonging to the second
zone around j1. Hence, the shared portion of supply sj1 that goes to transplant






sj1), respectively. Similarly, the
shared portion of supply sj2 that goes to transplant center t1 (in the second zone)







The access level At for each transplant center t is then computed as the ratio
between the total supply going to transplant center t and its demand dt. In our
























Given a proper zonal structure {z1j , z2j , . . . , z`j} defined for each donor hospital
j ∈H, and given the weights wh associated with each zone h ∈ Z, the shared supply
and the access level At for a transplant center t are formally defined as follows:
DEFINITION 8 The shared supply sajt that is sent from donor hospital j to








The access level At for a transplant center t is the sum of the shared supplies of the
donor hospitals associated with t:
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Figure 25. An example for clarifying access level computation for transplant centers.







3 Access Level Disparity
Variance, range, and other measures have been used in the literature for
measuring geographic disparity (Marsh and Schilling, 1994; Barbati and Bruno,
2018). In this study, we measure access level disparity as the maximum difference




n be the average access level across all the transplant centers, access level
disparity is then measured as
Max
t∈T
| At− Ā | (1)
4 The Boundary Allocation Problem
Let H be the set of m donor hospitals and T the set of n transplant centers.
For each donor hospital, j ∈H, let sj be the amount of supply at donor hospital
j ∈H, and dt be the amount of demand at transplant center t ∈ T . Let C ={ c0,
c1, . . . , cq} be a set of q predefined circles of increasing radii. Let ` be the number of
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zones to be defined around each donor hospital, and let wh be a weight assigned to
zone zh, ∀h ∈ Z. The access level for each transplant center t ∈ T is At. The
Boundary Allocation Problem looks for a zonal structure around each donor
hospital such that access level disparity across the transplant centers is minimized.
C Model Formulation
Let us define the binary parameter askjt, ∀s,k ∈ C,s < k,∀j ∈H,∀t ∈ T ,
which is equal to one if transplant center t is located outside of circle cs and inside
circle ck around donor hospital j, and zero otherwise. For a given zone zh, Cinh ⊂ C
denotes the index set of possible inner circles, and Couth,s ⊂ C denotes the index set of
possible outer circles where cs is the inner circle. Note that, if h= 1 (the first zone),
then Cin1 = {0} and Cout1,0 = {1,2, . . . , q− `+ 1}, whereas for h > 1,
Cinh = {h−1, . . . , q− `+h−1} and Couth,s = {s+ 1, . . . , q− `+h}.
We consider the set of binary decision variables yskhj ,
∀s ∈ Cinh ,∀k ∈ Couth,s ,∀h ∈ Z,∀j ∈H, whose value is equal to one if zhj = (cs, ck), that
is, if the h-th zone of donor hospital j is defined as the pair of circles (cs, ck), and it
is equal to zero otherwise. For clarity of the mathematical model, we also consider
the following auxiliary variables: the binary decision variables υhjt,
∀h ∈ Z,j ∈H,t ∈ T , whose value is equal to one if transplant center t is located in
zone h around donor hospital j and zero otherwise, and the continuous decision
variables At, ∀t ∈ T which indicate the access level for transplant center t. The
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υhjt ≥ 1, ∀t ∈ T (4)
∑
h∈Z



























sj , ∀t ∈ T (9)
yskhj ∈ {0,1}, ∀h ∈ Z,∀s ∈ Cinh , ∀k ∈ Couts,h , ∀j ∈H (10)
The objective function (2) minimizes access level disparity across the transplant
centers. Constraints (3) ensure that each zone around each donor hospital contains
at least one transplant center. Constraints (4) ensure that each transplant center is
covered by at least one donor hospital (i.e., there exists at least one donor hospital
zone to which the transplant center belongs). Constraints (5) ensure that all donor
hospital and transplant center pairs are connected through no more than one of the
zones around the donor hospital. Constraints (6) ensure that exactly l zones are
defined for each donor hospital. Constraints (7) ensure that the zonal structure
around each donor hospital is properly defined. Constraints (8) and (9) define
variables υhjt and At.
Note that the definition of access level At (constraints (9)) introduces
non-linearity in the model, which makes it difficult to solve even with standard
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available solvers. Moreover, model (2)–(10) is a general formulation which considers
the same set of predefined circles C ={c0, c1, . . . , cq} around each donor hospital and
defines the same number ` of zones around each donor hospital. The formulation
can be generalized to consider a different number `j of zones for each donor hospital
and a different set C j of circles around each donor hospital. However, current
practice assumes the same number of zones around each donor hospital; hence, it
would be unrealistic to assume otherwise. Additionally, it would be unrealistic to
assume the number of zones to be greater than five (the current policy considers five
zones - Local trough Zone D - and one additional zone - Zone E - as the national
level). In particular, as will be shown in section D, the results of our data-driven
strategy to compute the weights associated with each zone assign virtually all the
weight to the first three zones, i.e., z1, z2 and z3, with the other zones getting nearly
zero weight. For these reasons, in our computational experiments we analyzed two
scenarios which arise when the number of zones around each donor hospital is equal
to either two or three, `= 2 or `= 3. For these two cases, the model formulation for
BAP can be simplified. We showed the formulation for `= 3 in the Appendix A,
and the formulation for `= 2 can be defined similarly.
D Weight Tuning
As explained in section 2, the weights wh, ∀h ∈ Z assigned to each zone,
indicate the priority that the zones receive in the allocation process. With the
current allocation process, a recovered organ is first offered to candidates registered
in transplant centers closer to the donor hospital (i.e., transplant centers that
belong to the first zone around the donor hospital), and then, if a match is not
found, it is offered to candidates registered in transplant centers that belong to the
zones further away from the donor hospital. Hence, the role of the weights in the
mathematical model is paramount in distributing the available organs effectively
once the zonal structure is implemented.
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We applied a data-driven approach to define the weights such that the
difference between the potential supply (i.e., the available supply for a transplant
center) and the realized supply (i.e., the amount of organs effectively provided to a
transplant center) is as low as possible. Specifically, we define Pht as the total
potential supply from all the donor hospitals that are associated with transplant
center t ∈ T through their zone h. Similarly, we define Rht as the total realized
supply from all the donor hospitals that are associated with transplant center t ∈ T
through their zone h.
Figure 26. An example to illustrate the calculation for potential and realized supply
Consider Figure 26 with two transplant centers, t1 and t2, with demand dt1
and dt2 , respectively, and two donor hospitals, j1 and j2, with supply sj1 and sj2 ,
respectively, each with a zonal structure consisting of two zones. For transplant
center t1, which is located in the first zone around both donor hospitals, the potential
supply from the first zone is P1t1 =
dt1
dt1+dt2




sj1 . The supply in j1 is divided between the two transplant centers
t1 and t2 as a portion of their demand. For calculating Rht, we define vjt as the
number of organs sent and transplanted from donor hospital j to transplant center
t; consequently, in this scenario R1t1 = vj1t1 +vj2t1 , and R1t2 = vj2t2 .
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In our approach we considered the current homogeneous 6-Zone structure for
computing the potential and the realized supply. Specifically, we used the Thoracic
Simulation Allocation Model (TSAM) to calculate vjt. TSAM is a simulation
software developed by the US Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR)
(SAM, 2017) to simulate the allocation of hearts to candidates waiting for heart
transplants based on an event-sequenced Monte Carlo technique. We used TSAM
input data, from July 1st, 2009 to June 30th, 2011. The data contains 8,593 adult
candidates (i.e., age≥18). Of these transplant candidates, 2,621 of them were
registered at the beginning of the study period, and 5,972 new candidates were
added to the transplant list during the study period. 159 of the patients required
combined heart-lung transplant and were excluded from the study. The final data
set included a total of 8,434 heart transplant candidates and 3,770 donated heart
organs.
We applied the following optimization model to determine the optimal







| Phtwh−Rht | (11)
subject to∑
h∈Z
wh = 1, (12)
wh ≤ wk, ∀h,k ∈ Z(h > k) (13)
wh ≥ 0. ∀h ∈ Z (14)
Objective function (11) minimizes the total absolute difference between the potential
and realized supply across all transplant centers. Constraint (12) normalizes the
weights, and constraints (13) ensure that inner zones have greater weights.
The results of the model are shown in Table 17. The weight for the first zone
z1 was significantly higher than the weights for the other zones. This was an
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expected result given that the simulation results from TSAM showed that more
than 85% of the organs are allocated to the first zone. We used the weights in Table
17 for our model to design a heterogeneous zonal structure around donor hospitals.
TABLE 17
Zonal potential supply, zonal realized supply, and zonal weight based on the current
homogeneous zonal structure
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5
(Zone A) (Zone B) (Zone C) (Zone D) (Zone E)∑
h∈Z
∑
t∈T Pht 5,057 575 81 15 0∑
h∈Z
∑
t∈T Rht 3,421 377 51 7 0
wh 0.90 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00
E Experimental Analysis
1 Data
We used the data provided by OPTN on transplanted heart organs and
waitlist heart candidates from 2011 to 2014. We focused on donor hospitals and
transplant centers in the continental United States; hence, we excluded Puerto Rico,
Hawaii, and Alaska from our analysis. Supply in each donor hospital was the
number of recovered hearts after excluding the discarded hearts. Demand in each
transplant center was the number of transplant candidates registered on the heart
transplant list on a given year, excluding the waiting list candidates prior to that
year. We excluded pediatric patients (i.e., age<18), inactive patients1, and patients
on a combined transplant list (e.g., heart-lung). Table 18 shows the number of
donor hospitals, total supply, number of transplant centers, and total demand for
the four year period. We used data from 2014 to determine the optimal
1Inactive is the designation for patients who are temporarily removed from the heart transplant
waiting list due to health conditions or personal circumstances.
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heterogeneous zonal structure by solving our BAP model, while we used data from
2011, 2012, and 2013 to validate the model.
TABLE 18
The demographic of the study population
2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of Donor Hospitals 436 437 453 698
Total Supply 1,606 1,665 1,767 2,125
Number of Transplant
Centers
104 107 107 115
Total Demand 2,832 3,067 3,333 3,726
2 Scenario Description
The results from our weight tuning strategy revealed the high importance of
the first three zones in the current heart allocation system. Thus, we used our BAP
model to determine an optimal heterogeneous zonal structure, with two zones
(`= 2) and three zones (`= 3) around each donor hospital, and we refer to these
scenarios as heterogeneous 2-Zone and 3-Zone structures. Zonal structures around
each donor hospital were defined by selecting the best circles from a predefined set.
The radius for the predefined circles ranged from 100 to 1,200 miles in increments of
100 (for a total of 12 predefined circles). For designing the heterogeneous 2-Zone
structure we considered w1 = 0.9 and w2 = 0.1, and for the heterogeneous 3-Zone
structure we considered w1 = 0.9, w2 = 0.07, and w3 = 0.03. We compared the
results of our model with those of the corresponding homogeneous zonal structures
which we refer to as homogeneous 2-Zone and 3-Zone structures. The 2-Zone
homogeneous structure contained two zones around each donor hospital, with the
first and second zones having radii of 500 and 1000 miles, respectively. The
homogeneous 3-Zone structures contained three zones, with the first, second, and
third zones having radii of 500, 1000, and 1500 miles, respectively.
64
The comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous zonal structures is
carried out considering the following metrics:
1. Access Level Disparity: The access level disparity described in Section 3 was
compared for each zonal structure. In addition, we measured the range and
median access level across the transplant centers for both homogeneous and
heterogeneous zonal structures.
2. Zonal Structure Heterogeneity: For each circle ck in C, we calculated the
percentage of donor hospitals that contain circle ck in their zonal structure.
3. Distance Traveled by Organs: For each transplant center, we measured the
distance that an organ has to travel to be transplanted in that transplant
center. For example, if for transplant center t, five organs are sent from a
donor hospital 100 miles away, and 10 organs are sent from a donor hospital
40 miles away, the weighted average distance for an organ to travel to
transplant center t is: 5×100+10×405+10 = 60 miles. We measured the variation in
travel distance across transplant centers. Additionally, we calculated the
national average distance traveled by organs.
The robustness of the model with respect to changes in the input data was
evaluated using an extensive sensitivity analysis. Specifically, we considered the
following analyses:
1. Supply and Demand: We investigated whether our heterogeneous zonal
structure is robust to changes in supply and demand by using the data from
2014 as the training data set and the data from 2011 to 2013 as the test data
sets. We solved the BAP model with the training data set to obtain an
optimized heterogeneous zonal structure. Then, we compared the access level
across transplant centers using test data set and the optimized heterogeneous
zonal structure.
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2. Maximum Circle Radius: Maximum circle radius is the radius of the
outermost circle in the predefined set of concentric circles. We ran the model
multiple times by changing the maximum circle radius from 700 to 1,500 miles
in increments of 100. We analyzed the effect of the changes on the access level
disparity and on the travel distance.
F Results
1 Access Level Disparity
Access level disparity for heterogeneous 2-Zone structure was 0.003, while for
homogeneous 2-Zone structure it was 0.307. Additionally, access level across
transplant centers for heterogeneous 2-Zone structure ranged from 0.56 to 0.57
hearts per candidate (median=0.57), and for homogeneous 2-Zone structure ranged
from 0.26 to 0.80 hearts per candidate (median=0.59). We calculated the average
access level across the transplant centers in each OPO. Figure 27 shows the
variation in the average access level across OPOs. OPOs with light color do not
contain any transplant center. For heterogeneous 2-Zone structure the access level
ranged from 0.56 to 0.57 hearts per candidate across OPOs, while for homogeneous
2-Zone structure it ranged from 0.26 to 0.80 hearts per candidate.
Access level disparity for heterogeneous 3-Zone structure was 0.009, and for
homogeneous 3-Zone structure was 0.183. Specifically, the access level across
transplant centers for heterogeneous 3-Zone structure ranged from 0.56 to 0.58
hearts per candidate (median=0.57), and for homogeneous 3-Zone structure ranged
from 0.38 to 0.73 hearts per candidate (median=0.57). Figure 28 shows the average
access level for both heterogeneous and homogeneous 3-Zone structures across
OPOs. For heterogeneous 3-Zone structure the access level ranged from 0.56 to 0.58
hearts per candidate across OPOs, while for homogeneous 3-Zone structure it
ranged from 0.39 to 0.72 hearts per candidate across OPOs.
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Figure 27. Variation in access level across OPOs for homogeneous 2-Zone structure
(top), and heterogeneous 2-Zone structure (bottom).
2 Zonal Structure Heterogeneity
Figures 29 and 30 show the percentage of donor hospitals for different zone
radius for heterogeneous 2-Zone and 3-Zone structures, respectively. We referred to
the first zone as Zone A, the second zone as Zone B, and the third zone as Zone C.
Note that for the homogeneous 2-Zone structure for 100% of the donor hospitals,
Zone A radius was 500, and Zone B radius was 1,000 miles. For the heterogeneous
2-Zone structure, for 57% of the donor hospitals Zone A radius was less than or
equal to 500 miles, and for 56% of the donor hospitals Zone B radius was less than
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Figure 28. Variation in access level across OPOs for homogeneous 3-Zone structure
(top), and heterogeneous 3-Zone structure (bottom).
or equal to 1,000 miles.
Note that with 12 predefined circles there are 66 possibles configurations for a
2-Zone structure. The optimal heterogeneous 2-Zone structure assigned all the 66
possible configurations to the 698 donor hospitals.
The homogeneous 3-Zone structure is such that for 100% of the donor
hospitals Zone A radius was 500, Zone B radius was 1,000, and Zone C radius was
1,500 miles. For the heterogeneous 3-Zone structure, for 48% of donor hospitals
Zone A radius was less than or equal to 500 miles; for 71% of the donor hospitals
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Figure 29. Zone A and Zone B radius around donor hospitals for heterogeneous
2-Zone structure
Zone B radius was less than or equal to 1,000 miles, and for 100% of the donor
hospitals Zone C radius was less than or equal to 1,200 miles.
Additionally, based on the 12 predefined set of circles, there are 222 possible
configurations for a 3-Zone structure. Among them the model assigned only 126
different configurations to the 698 donor hospitals.
Figure 30. Zone A, Zone B and Zone C radius around donor hospitals for heteroge-
neous 3-Zone structure
3 Distance Traveled by Organs
Table 19 shows the minimum, maximum, median, and national average
distance traveled by organs in homogeneous and heterogeneous zonal structures.
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The average distance traveled by organs for a heterogeneous 2-Zone structure
ranged from 243 to 634 miles across transplant centers, and for a homogeneous
2-Zone structure, it ranged from 240 to 460 miles across transplant centers. The
average distance traveled by organs for heterogeneous 3-Zone structure, ranged from
230 to 595 miles across transplant centers, and for homogeneous 3-Zone structure, it
ranged from 267 to 514 miles across transplant centers.
TABLE 19
Minimum, maximum, median, and average distance traveled by organs (miles) across
transplant centers
Heterogeneous Homogeneous
2-Zone 3-Zone 2-Zone 3-Zone
Minimum 243 230 240 267
Maximum 634 595 460 514
Median 440 385 368 379
National Average 425 380 368 375
G Sensitivity Analysis
1 Supply and Demand
To determine if the access level in both heterogeneous 3-Zone and 2-Zone
structures was robust to changes in supply and demand, we validated the results
from the BAP model with multiple test data sets. Figures 31 and 32 show the
variation in access level across transplant centers for 2011 to 2014 for heterogeneous
2-Zone and 3-Zone structures, respectively.
Since the zonal structure is optimized using 2014 data, the variation in access
level for this year is at the minimum level. We see from the figures that even with
test data sets the variation in access level across transplant centers is lower with a
heterogeneous zonal structure than with a homogeneous zonal structure.
It should be mentioned that the access level disparity for heterogeneous
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2-Zone structure was 0.51, 0.50, and 0.49 for the 2011, 2012, and 2013 data,
respectively, while for the homogeneous zonal structure it was 0.51, 0.51, and 0.50,
respectively. Similarly for heterogeneous 3-Zone structure access level disparity was
0.56, 0.54, and 0.53 for the 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, while for
homogeneous 3-Zone structure was 0.57, 0.54, and 0.53, respectively. It seems that
the access level disparity did not change with heterogeneous zonal structure;
however, the access level disparity minimizes the largest different from average
access level across transplant centers, which can be sensitive to outliers (as shown in
the box plots in Figure 31 and 32). However, Figures 31 and 32 show the variation
in access level across transplant centers for heterogeneous zonal structure was
significantly less than for the homogeneous zonal structure.
Figure 31. Variation in access level across transplant centers for heterogeneous and
homogeneous 2-Zone structures with test (2011-2013) and training data set (2014).
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Figure 32. Variation in access level across transplant centers for heterogeneous and
homogeneous 3-Zone structures with test (2011-2013) and training data set (2014).
2 Maximum Circle Radius
2.1 Access Level Disparity
By increasing the maximum circle radius from 700 miles to 1,500 miles, the
access level disparity decreased from 0.135 to 0.004 for the heterogeneous 3-Zone
structure and from 0.099 to 0.005 for the heterogeneous 2-Zone structure (Table 20).
Figure 33 shows the variation in access level across transplant centers for
2-Zone and 3-Zone structures. When the maximum circle radius was increased, the
variation in access level across transplant centers for both heterogeneous 2-Zone and
3-Zone structures decreased. When the maximum circle radius was greater than or
equal to 1,200 miles, the variation in access level did not change. When the
maximum circle radius increased the median access level across transplant centers
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TABLE 20

















slightly increased from 0.55 to 0.59 hearts per candidate for heterogeneous 2-Zone
structure, and from 0.54 to 0.57 hearts per candidate for heterogeneous 3-Zone
structure.
2.2 Distance Traveled by Organs
Figure 34 shows the variation in the average distance traveled by organs
across transplant centers. When the maximum circle radius increased the average
travel distance for both the heterogeneous 2-Zone and 3-Zone structures slightly
increased. When the maximum circle radius increased the variation in average
travel distance across transplant centers did not change. We compared the national
average travel distance for heterogeneous zonal structure versus homogeneous zonal
structure (Figure 35). Red lines correspond to the 2-Zone structures and blue lines
correspond to the 3-Zone structures. When the maximum circle radius increased the
national average distance traveled by organs for both the heterogeneous 2-Zone and
3-Zone structures increased. However, when maximum circle radius was less than or
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Figure 33. Variation in access level across transplant centers for heterogeneous zonal
structure
equal to 900 miles, the average travel distance for the heterogeneous 2-Zone
structure was less than for the homogeneous 2-Zone structure. On the other hand,
when maximum circle radius was less than or equal to 1,200 miles, the national
average distance for the heterogeneous 3-Zone structure was less than for the
homogeneous 3-Zone structure.
H Discussion
Our optimization model for tuning the weight assigned to each zone showed
that designing up to three zones around each donor hospital was sufficient to
minimize access level disparity. Thus, we used BAP model and designed two
different zonal structures, consisting of two zones and three zones.
Our results indicated that heterogeneous 2-Zone and 3-Zone structures
reduced access level disparity significantly. Our analysis of the effect of maximum
circle radius on access level disparity indicated that increasing maximum circle
radius decreased access level disparity. However, no circle needed to be greater than
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Figure 34. Variation in travel distance across transplant centers for heterogeneous
zonal structure
1,200 miles to achieve minimum access level disparity for both heterogeneous 2-Zone
and 3-Zone structures.
Figure 35 shows that, of any value for the maximum circle radius, the
national average distance for heterogeneous 2-Zone structure was greater than for
the heterogeneous 3-Zone structure. This comparison suggested that a
heterogeneous zonal structure consisting of three zones had a lower national average
travel distance and the access level disparity.
In summary, our results showed that the heterogeneous 3-Zone structure of
maximum circle radius of 1,200 miles reduced access level disparity significantly and
did not increase the national average distance traveled by organs. Additionally, with
the heterogeneous 3-Zone structure of maximum circle radius of 1,200 miles, Zone A
radius for 51% of donor hospitals was less than or equal to 500 miles, Zone B radius
for 71% of donor hospitals was less than or equal to 1,000 miles and Zone C radius
for all the donor hospitals was less than or equal to 1,200 miles. In contrast to
homogeneous 3-Zone structure where organs might travel up to 1,500 miles, with
heterogeneous 3-Zone structure organs might travel up to 1,200 miles.
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Figure 35. National average distance traveled by organs for heterogeneous zonal
structure with different maximum zone radii in comparison with homogeneous zonal
structure. The red lines are 2-Zone structures and the blue lines are 3-Zone structures
Furthermore, our sensitivity analysis on changes in supply and demand
showed that heterogeneous zonal structure was robust to changes in supply and
demand, meaning that with changes in supply and demand the access level disparity
of that heterogeneous zonal structure was significantly less than for homogeneous
zonal structure.
I Conclusion
We introduced a new optimization problem, that is, Boundary Allocation
Problem, to design a heterogeneous zonal structure around donor hospitals to reduce
geographic disparity in access to heart transplants. To measure geographic
disparity, we defined a new metric that is a function of supply to demand ratio and
of the distance between supply and demand locations. Disparity in access to
transplants was quantified as the largest difference between transplant centers’
access level from the average access level across all the transplant centers.
We made some assumptions in our BAP model. First, we did not consider
the medical status of the candidates in prioritizing them. In our model all
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candidates are equal regardless of their age, blood type, waiting time or other
candidates characteristics. Second, we did not include any acceptance criteria to
model candidates’ behavior when an offer is made. Instead, we assumed all offers
are accepted. Third, we did not consider the time varying nature of the allocation
system. Currently, OPTN uses TSAM for evaluating different heart allocation
system. The current version of TSAM is not compatible with heterogeneous zonal
structure. Consequently, currently we cannot analyze the effect of our optimized
heterogeneous zonal structure on transplant rate, waiting time and mortality rate.
Developing a simulation model which is compatible with a heterogeneous zonal
structure is objective of future research.
Additionally, our disparity metric for measuring geographic disparity can be
sensitive to outliers since it minimizes the largest difference from the average access
level across transplant centers. However, using such a metric to design an optimal
heterogeneous zonal structure resulted in lowest variation in access level since the
metric minimizes the gap between the possible outlier and the average access level.
We performed an extensive computational analysis to evaluate the benefit of
heterogeneous zonal structure instead of the current homogeneous zonal structure.
We concluded that in order to reduce geographic disparity, designing three zones
around donor hospitals is sufficient. Our optimized heterogeneous zonal structure
not only reduced geographic disparity in access to heart transplants without
increasing average distance traveled by organs, but also was robust to changes in
supply and demand. Additionally, with heterogeneous zonal structure no organ
travels longer than 1,200 miles, while with homogeneous zonal structure some
organs might travel up to 1,500 miles. Using mathematical modeling to design a
zonal structure by taking into account the distribution of supply and demand across
the country led to a better solution.
77
CHAPTER IV
HEART ALLOCATION SIMULATION MODEL
A Introduction
An optimization model alone provides only a deterministic view of the impact
of any policy for allocating organs. A simulation model provides more information
about the uncertain environment of the organ allocation system. United Network of
Organ Sharing (UNOS) currently uses the Thoracic Simulation Allocation Model
(TSAM) to evaluate the impact of any heart allocation policy (Colvin et al., 2016).
TSAM has the ability to simulate the allocation of hearts to candidates waiting for
heart transplants based on an event-sequenced Monte Carlo technique. TSAM has
been purposefully designed to serve studies investigating alternative organ
allocation models (Colvin et al., 2016).
TSAM, which is available to the public but only as an executable file, offers
very little flexibility to its users in evaluating different policies (TSAM, 2017). For
instance, it does not support the heterogeneous zonal structure that we designed in
Chapter III. The radius for the zones can be modified in TSAM, but the zonal
structure for the donor hospitals must be the same. To overcome this limitation, we
have developed a clinically detailed simulation model for the United States heart
allocation system.
Simulation modeling has been widely used by researchers to evaluate different
organ allocation policies. The first simulation model was developed in 1995 for the
liver allocation system by Pritsker et al. (1995), and later evolved into what is
known today as SRTR Liver and Kidney-Pancreas Simulated Allocation Models
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(LSAM and KPSAM, respectively). The TSAM simulation model was later added
to this package. For the kidney and liver allocation systems several researchers have
developed simulation models to evaluate alternative allocation policies. For
example, for the U.S. liver allocation system, discrete-event simulation models have
been developed (Kreke et al., 2002; Shechter et al., 2005; Alagoz et al., 2005). For
the U.S. kidney allocation system, Monte Carlo and discrete event simulation
models have been developed (Zenios et al., 1999; Davis et al., 2013a,b).
Additionally, a recent study developed a kidney allocation system by replicating
KPSAM to evaluate different allocation policies (Sandıkçı et al., 2019).
The only simulation model developed for the heart allocation system in the
United States was proposed by Hasankhani and Khademi (2017). They developed a
discrete event simulation to investigate three alternative allocation policies. Their
work overcame some of the limitations of TSAM; however, it does not support
heterogeneous zonal structure.
For developing our simulation model, we share the basic structure of TSAM.
Our model makes it possible to evaluate heart allocation policies, prior to any
potential implementation, and, therefore, to provide a decision support tool to the
U.S. heart transplant policy makers and researchers.
B Heart Allocation System
The U.S. heart allocation system uses transplant candidates, donors
characteristics, and geographic classification to allocate hearts to transplant
candidates. In particular, transplant candidates registered on the waiting list are
prioritized based on their medical condition, distance from available organ,
compatibility with the organ donor, and waiting time.
The OPTN policy prioritizes candidates for a herat transplant based on their
medical status and their distance from the donor hospital. Tables 1 and 2 in
Chapter II show the sequence for the heart allocation system. The policy excludes
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all the candidates who are not compatible with the organ donor in terms of blood
type, weight, height, age, and possibly gender, if there is any requirement on gender
for a specific candidate. After screening out incompatible candidates, if there are
multiple candidates with the same characteristics eligible for receiving the organ,
then the organ would first be offered to the candidate with the longest waiting time.
The candidate can accept or decline the offer based on the organ characteristics and
the survival benefit. The organ will be offered to the candidates on the priority list
until someone accepts the organ; otherwise the organ will be discarded.
If a candidate accepts the offer, then the organ will be sent to the transplant
center, where the transplant candidate is registered, for transplantation. If, after the
transplant, the organ fails and the transplant recipient survives, he/she will be
added to the transplant list again.
C Simulation Framework
We designed a discrete event simulation model for heart allocation system to
assess alternative heart allocation policies, which are not feasible with TSAM. From
here, we refer to our simulation model as HASim (Heart Allocation Simulation
Model). We have independently replicated most of the concepts in TSAM (TSAM,
2017). Similar to TSAM we extensively used historical data on heart
transplantation in the United States.
Figure 36 shows the simulation framework of the U.S. heart allocation
system, which is triggered by three main events: (i) patient arrival, (ii) patient
status update, and (iii) organ arrival. The specific components of the simulation
model are described next.
1 Patient Arrival
Patients enter the system in three ways: (i) patients on the initial waiting
list, (ii) patients who register on the transplant list during the study period, and
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Figure 36. Simulation framework for the heart allocation system in the United States
(iii) patients who after receiving a heart transplant faces graft failure, which is
estimated by the survival module in Section 4.
The initial waiting list is the list of patients who are already waiting for a
transplant when simulation starts. New patients are added to the initial waiting list
based on their arrival time in the system. The initial waiting list and the list of
patients who register on the transplant waiting list during the study period, are
generated as input data. For each record of patients, we assigned a total of 38
characteristics, including age, weight, height, patient status, gender, registered
transplant center, OPO, arrival time, among others. The arrival time for patients
relisted in the waiting list is calculated based on graft’s survival time, which is
estimated by the post-transplant survival module.
2 Patient Status Update
When patients are registered on the waiting list, they are assigned a status
related to their medical condition. However, this medical status for patients may
change while they are waiting for a transplant.
We imported historical information on patients status changes, generated
from the OPTN data, into the model. During the simulation this module updates
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the patients’ status if they are still on the waiting list. Some patients who are
waiting for a transplant might be removed from the waiting list due to worsening
their condition or other reasons, or they might die while they are waiting for
transplant. In these cases, this module removes the patient from transplant the
waiting list.
3 Organ Arrival
Upon each organ arrival, a total of 33 organ characteristics is considered for
the organ. Then, the module looks for a match for the organ. To do so, it creates a
priority list of patients based on the sequence specified in the allocation policy, and,
if the list contains no patients, the module moves to the next allocation sequence
and creates a new priority list. The module offers the recovered organ to the patient
on the top of the priority list. Then, it calculate the probability of acceptance for the
patient, to estimate if the patient will accept the offer or not. The module continues
offering the recovered organs until one of these two cases happens: (i) a patient
accepts the organ, or (ii) the number of offers exceeds a user-specified upper limit.
In, the following, we explain the priority list and acceptance model as sub-modules
for the organ arrival.
3.1 Priority List
Creating a priority list of patients for a specific organ depends on the
sequence specified in the allocation policy. The module generates such a list, based
on the allocation zone, blood type compatibility, and patient medical status
requirement. When this list is created, all the patients who are not compatible with
the organ based on characteristics such as height, weight, and age are removed from
this list and then the module sort the patients based on their waiting times.
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3.2 Acceptance Model
Whenever an offer has been made, this module calculates the probability of
the patient accepting the offered organ. TSAM computes such a probability as a
function of several factors related to the organ and donor characteristics, potential
organ recipient’s characteristics, and factors specific to the compatibility to
donor-recipient pair. If we define xi as the scalar variable related to the patient’s
characteristics, and yj as the scalar variable related to the organ’s characteristics,
then acceptance probability is ∑i∑j βijxiyj , where βij is the coefficient for related
to the specific donor-recipient pair. In our model, we used the same coefficients as
TSAM. For each organ offer, this equation is calculated, and the resulting value is
transformed using an inverse logit transformation:
exp(∑i∑j βijxiyj)
1 + exp(∑i∑j βijxiyj) .
That value is then compared to a random variate from a Uniform (0,1) distribution.
If it is greater than the random number, then the organ is accepted; otherwise, it is
rejected.
4 Post Transplant Graft Survival
When a patient receives a graft, this module estimates the time, T , remaining
before death. We used the same parametric models used by TSAM to determine the
post-transplant events and to estimate the corresponding time until failure (TSAM,
2017). TSAM uses a cox regression model to estimate the survival time. T
calculated as:





Where S(t) is a step function that can be defined by the user, S(t) denotes the
probability of survival after t days from the transplant. Similar to the acceptance
model, xi and yj are scalar variables related to patient’s and organ’s characteristics,
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and αij is the donor-recipient coefficient. The values we used for the coefficients for
the αij are the same of those used in TSAM.
Then, at each transplantation event, the model determines the remaining
survival time by sampling a value u from a Uniform(0,1) distribution and inverting
the complementary cumulative probability distribution for the survival time for this
patient:
Prob[survival time > T ] = u
T = S−1( exp(ln(u))exp(∑i∑j αijxiyj))








which results in 0< v < 1. The model then uses the step function to determine the
corresponding survival time.
5 Simulation Outcomes
According to the survival time estimation, the simulation outcome are:
• Transplant recipient and graft survival: the graft estimated failure time is
after the end of simulation period. Thus, transplant recipient with his/her
graft survives throughout the rest of the simulation period.
• Death: graft fails and the recipient dies before the end of the simulation.
• Relisting: graft fails but the recipient survives and he/she is added to the
transplant waiting list again.
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D Model Validation
We used the simulation output files to validate the model on multiple
performance metrics against TSAM outcomes to ensure that the model adequately
represents the heart allocation system. To do so, we ran the simulation model for 10
replications with the current allocation policy that uses homogeneous zonal
structure. The homogeneous zonal structure is the same across the donor hospitals
and consist of local area and five concentric circle with radii of 500, 1000, 1500,
2500, and outside 2500 miles. We ran HASim using the three patient status
definition (i.e., status 1A, 1B, and 2). For model validation we used TSAM input
data from July 1st, 2009 to June 30th, 2011. This data contained 2,554 transplant
candidates on the initial waiting list, 5,864 new candidates to be added to the
transplant list, and 3,770 heart organs to be recovered during the simulation. More
information about TSAM input data is provided in Appendix B.
Table 21 shows the simulation outcomes from TSAM, and from HASim and
the relative error between them, computed as:
Relative Error = HASim−TSAM
HASim
We performed a t-student test to evaluate whether the HASim outcomes is
significantly different from TSAM. The null hypothesis in this test is that HASim
and TSAM are different, and a p-value>0.05 rejects the null hypothesis. The
p-value resulted from the t-student test showed that the overall outcome from
HASim is not significantly different from TSAM.
Table 22 shows the number of transplants on different groups of patients
resulted from TSAM, HASim, and the relative difference. Similarly, Table 23 shows
the number of death among the transplant candidates for TSAM and HASim. The
results for model validation clearly illustrate that HASim outputs closely match
TSAM (except for status 2 recipients).
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TABLE 21
Model validation on different simulation outcomes.
TSAM HASim Relative Error P-value
Transplant 3,734 3,711 -0.61% 0.773
Death 861 846 -1.89% 0.472
Removed 834 854 2.34% 0.386
Waiting 2,992 3,007 0.49% 0.740
E Heterogeneous vs Homogeneous Zonal Structure
We used HASim to compare the optimized heterogeneous zonal structure,
designed in Chapter III, with the current homogeneous zonal structure. We ran
HASim for 10 replications. The main focus of our analysis was to compare these two
systems in terms of geographic disparity in access to heart transplants. For this
purpose, we presented the results of our evaluation in term of transplant rate,
waiting time and pre-transplant mortality rate and average travel distance. It
should be noted that we ran the simulation for these two systems based on the same
allocation policy and the same patients status definition. The only difference
between these two systems was the radius for the zones around donor hospitals.
Additionally, we just considered the first three zones around donor hospitals. The
allocation policy inside the first three zones around donor hospitals is provided in
Appendix B.
For Our analysis we used OPTN data set from 2011 to 2014. This data
contains 11,560 transplant candidates who registered on the heart transplant
waiting list during the study period, and 8,130 recovered heart organs. We did not
consider data in hospitals and transplant centers in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and
Alaska. Additionally, we did not consider pediatric candidates (i.e., age<18),
multi-organ transplant candidates (i.e., heart-lung), and candidates that were on
the waiting list prior to January 2011. More information about the input data is
provided in Appendix B.
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TABLE 22
Model validation on number of heart transplants based on patients status, age, blood
type, and year.
TSAM HASim Relative Error P-Value
Status 1A 2,133 2,055 -3.79% 0.249
1B 1,414 1,407 -0.49% 0.898
2 187 249 24.80% 0.004
Age 18-34 370 365 -1.36% 0.866
35-48 701 703 0.28% 0.958
49-63 1,868 1,819 -2.69% 0.398
64-74 795 824 3.50% 0.436
Blood Type A 1,515 1,537 1.43% 0.693
B 550 560 1.78% 0.750
AB 216 221 2.26% 0.812
O 1,455 1,393 -4.45% 0.253
Year 2009 902 894 -0.89% 0.835
2010 1,889 1,880 -0.47% 0.865
2011 903 937 3.62% 0.740
Table 24 shows the summary statistics of the transplant rate, the waiting
time, the pre-transplant mortality rate, and the travel distance for homogeneous
and heterogeneous zonal structure. For each metric the table reports the average,
standard deviation (STD), interquartile range (IQR; i.e., between 25th and 75th
percentiles), and range across transplant centers. Figure 37 shows the distribution
of transplant rate, waiting time, and pre-transplant mortality rate, and travel
distance across transplant centers.
The average transplant rate for homogeneous and heterogeneous zonal
structures was the same. Similarly, the STD, IQR, and range of transplant rate did
not change when adopting one of the two zonal structures.
For waiting time, with heterogeneous zonal structure the average waiting
time increased for 8 days, while the standard deviation in waiting time across
transplant centers decreased from 24.34 to 19.75. Additionally, the maximum
waiting time across transplant center for homogeneous zonal structure was 145 days
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TABLE 23
Model validation on number of deaths based on patients status, age, blood type, and
year.
TSAM HASim Relative Error P-Value
Status 1A 54 59 8.47% 0.674
1B 100 106 5.66% 0.684
2 64 62 -3.22% 0.856
inactive 315 328 3.96% 0.597
Age 18-34 90 86 -4.65% 0.732
35-48 146 136 -7.35% 0.588
49-63 414 409 -1.22% 0.862
64-74 212 201 -5.47% 0.497
Blood Type A 287 280 -2.50% 0.774
B 81 74 -9.45% 0.507
AB 22 18 -22.22% 0.497
O 472 460 -2.60% 0.697
Year 2009 201 194 -3.60% 0.736
2010 418 413 -1.19% 0.829
2011 243 225 -8.00% 0.404
and for heterogeneous zonal structure was 95 days.
The average pre-transplant mortality rate for both homogeneous and
heterogeneous zonal structures was the same. However, with heterogeneous zonal
structure the standard deviation in mortality rate decreased from 0.15 to 0.02, and
the maximum mortality rate across transplant centers decreased from 0.33 to 0.20.
With heterogeneous zonal structure the average travel distance decreased
from 304.32 to 289.89 miles. Additionally, heterogeneous zonal structure decreased
the standard deviation in travel distance from 156.05 to 96.75 miles, and the




Comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous zonal structures in terms of
transplant rate, waition time, mortality rate, and travel distance.
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Transplant Rate Average 0.65 0.64
STD 0.14 0.13
IQR 0.15 0.15
Range 0.28 - 0.90 0.30 - 0.91
Waiting Time Average 59.00 67.00
STD 24.34 19.75
IQR 28.94 26.87
Range 1 - 145 1 - 95
Pre-transplant Mortality Rate Average 0.07 0.06
STD 0.15 0.02
IQR 0.04 0.03
Range 0 - 0.33 0 - 0.20
Travel Distance (mile) Average 304.32 289.89
STD 156.05 96.75
IQR 142.02 153.67
Range 0 - 1,485 0 - 663
F Conclusion
The heart allocation system is complex in nature and implementing new
changes requires careful consideration. Simulation modeling has been considered as
an efficient way for assessing and evaluating possible changes in the allocation
systems before being implemented.
In this chapter we developed a simulation model for the heart allocation
system in the United States as an alternative to TSAM. We replicated most of
TSAM features and adding more flexibility to evaluate alternative allocation
policies. We validated HASim with TSAM. We performed the validation on overall
outcomes and on the outcome for different groups of patients. The results from our
validation indicated that HASim clearly represented the U.S. heart allocation
system.
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Figure 37. Comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous zonal structures in
terms of (a) transplant rate, (b) waiting time, (c) pre-transplant mortality rate, and
(d) travel distance.
We used HASim to compare a heterogeneous zonal structure versus a
homogeneous zonal structure one, in terms of disparity in access to a transplant.
We measured access using different metrics, including, transplant rate, waiting time
to a transplant, pre-transplant mortality rate and average travel distance. Our
analysis indicated that with a heterogeneous zonal structure disparity in transplant
rate across transplant centers did not change, however, disparity in terms of waiting
time, pre-transplant mortality rate and average travel distance decreased. It should
be noted that the average waiting time increased slightly (8 days) with a
90
heterogeneous zonal structure. On the other hand, the average travel distance and
the maximum travel distance decreased from 156.05 to 96.75 miles and from 1,485
to 663 miles, respectively. Even though with heterogeneous zonal structure we
allocated organs maximum in 1,200 miles from donor hospitals (as oppose to
homogeneous zonal structure with three zones that allocates organs within 1,500
miles), the total transplant rate was 86%, which is the same as homogeneous zonal
structure.
Our analysis showed that a customized zonal structure, based on supply and
demand distribution reduces disparity. We outline that, in our analysis, given the
available data, we considered a three status grouping of the patients (i.e., Status 1A,
1B and 2), however, an analysis with the current grouping of patients in six status
should be performed. Unfortunately, currently the OPTN data does not provide
information on the new patient status definition, however HASim provides the
opportunity for this analysis.
There are some limitations related to HASim. First, we used the historical
data for patients and organ arrivals, and for updating patient status. Using
historical data is more accurate for estimating the events in the simulation model.
However, it is not sufficient for predicting future changes. Second, patients who
underwent transplants in real life have no status updates in their patient records
after the transplant date. The historical date on status update is incomplete. Third,
with HASim organs are discarded after a fixed number of declined offers, regardless
of organ and donor characteristics.
In this study, we developed a simulation model for the U.S. heart allocation
system and validated its performance. We used this model to evaluate
heterogeneous zonal structure, and the simulation result indicated that the
optimized heterogeneous zonal structure reduces geographic disparity in travel
distance, waiting time and pre-transplant mortality rate.
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CHAPTER V
OPTIMAL INTEGRATION OF DESENSITIZATION PROTOCOLS
INTO KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION (KPD) PROGRAMS
A Introduction
Blood type (ABO) incompatibility and antibody to donor human leukocyte
antigen (HLA) remain the most significant barriers in transplantation. Literature
reports (Ferrari et al., 2014) that both access to and outcomes of kidney transplants
are worse among those patients with high degrees of ABO and HLA
incompatibilities (ABOi and HLAi, respectively). The degree of histocompatibility
barriers is measured using an immunological lab test known as Panel Reactive
Antibody (PRA). The PRA score ranges between 0% and 100% , and the transplant
candidates with a PRA score of 80% or higher are defined as "highly sensitized"
patients. Sensitization is commonly acquired as a result of pregnancy, transfusion,
prior transplant, and viral/bacterial infections. Highly sensitized patients were
known to wait significantly longer on a deceased donor kidney waitlist (Haririan
et al., 2009), at least until the 2014 kidney allocation policy change that prioritized
them on the waitlist, and their risk of post-transplant graft failure is reported to be
substantially higher than other patients (Zachary and Leffell, 2014; Mattsson et al.,
2008; Marfo et al., 2011). Similarly, patients with blood type O tend to experience
more difficulty getting a donor and thus tend to have a longer wait time (Wolfe
et al., 2000; Crew and Ratner, 2010; Kannabhiran et al., 2012). In the United
States, there is about a 35% chance that any two people are ABOi, and about a
30% chance that a transplant candidate is sensitized (Montgomery et al., 2011). For
92
these patients, available options to improve both access to and outcomes of
transplants are desensitization and kidney paired donor (KPD) exchange, the
system that allows incompatible donor-patient pairs to exchange their living donors
with other incompatible pairs within the program.
Desensitization of transplant candidates was first introduced about two
decades ago as a promising treatment to overcome histocompatibility barriers
(Wallis et al., 2011; Gentry et al., 2011). The protocols of desensitization are
performed prior to transplantation to reduce/eliminate incompatibilities and donor
specific antibody through a series of immunosuppression regimens. Despite the
recent advancement in the desensitization protocol, challenges remain among highly
sensitized patients. Literature suggests (Zachary and Leffell, 2014) that the
desensitization protocols alone may not be able to reduce the antibody level enough
to make a transplant possible for these patients. In these cases, undergoing
desensitization as well as identifying a more compatible donor via KPD exchange is
recognized as a novel promising approach (Montgomery et al., 2005; Montgomery,
2010; Montgomery et al., 2011). KPD exchange was first introduced in 2000 in the
United States as a way to overcome ABOi and HLAi between patients and their
living donors (Montgomery et al., 2011). The patients undergoing the combination
of desensitization and KPD can be desensitized more efficiently to meet the
compatibility requirements (Montgomery et al., 2012). Early evidence suggests that
the combination of the two procedures leads to an increase of the transplant rates
(Montgomery et al., 2005; Montgomery, 2010; Montgomery et al., 2011).
Motivated by this current status, the goal of this paper is to develop a
simulation-optimization approach to optimally incorporating desensitization into a
KPD exchange and evaluating the benefit of such an integration. In this study, we
specifically focus on ABOi desensitization. This is because the structure of ABOi is
less complex with ABO antibody titers being the only element, while HLAi
desensitization needs to take compatibilities of several antigen classes as well as
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donor specific antibodies into account. Moreover, a recent large-scale study reports
that the transplant outcomes of ABOi and ABO compatible transplants (in terms of
both patient mortality and graft failure) are comparable (Opelz et al., 2015;
Montgomery et al., 2012). In terms of desensitization for HLAi, the transplant
community seems to have more reservation due to the relatively poor long-term
transplant outcomes (Pankhurst et al., 2017; Lefaucheur et al., 2010). Thus, focusing
on ABOi in this exploratory study allows us to develop an optimization model
without compromising the realism of desensitization impacts and the outcomes.
Prior operations research literature on KPD investigates the optimal strategy
to match donors to patients within a given set of incompatible pairs (Dai and
Tayur, 2018; Anderson et al., 2015; Constantino et al., 2013). The corresponding
optimization problem is known in the literature as the Kidney Exchange Problem
(KEP), which consists in determining the maximum number of transplants which
can be performed among a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs. Several
mathematical formulations have been proposed (Anderson et al., 2015; Constantino
et al., 2013; Mak-Hau, 2017) to model KEP. These existing studies exclusively look
for possible matches without considering the possibility of combining KPD and
desensitization, often resulting in less than 15% of highly sensitized patients finding
a compatible pair in a match run (Montgomery et al., 2011). In this study, we
adapt the existing models to overcome this limitation by including the possibility
that some of the patients in the pool could undergo a desensitization protocol to
improve their compatibility with the matched donor via KPD. We embed the model
into a simulation framework and perform an extensive experimental analysis to
evaluate the impact of optimally integrating a desensitization protocol in a KPD
program. The outcome measures of our analysis are:
• Increase in the transplant rate,
• Increase in the number of transplants among highly sensitized patients,
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• Increase in the number of transplants among blood type O patients,
• Decrease in wait time for a transplant.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section B, we formally
describe the Kidney Exchange Problem (KEP) and provide details on how existing
mathematical models can be adapted to integrate desensitization. Section C
contains the description of our experimental setting. The results are presented in
Section D. Discussion of the results, limitation of the approach, and further
extensions are the objectives of Section E.
B Optimization Model
A possible run of a KPD can be modeled using a graph representation
(hereafter referred to as compatibility graph) such as the one shown in Figure 38.
Each node i in the graph represents an incompatible patient-donor pair {pi,di} .
There are 7 incompatible pairs represented in the graph. An arc (i, j) from node i to
node j means that donor di is compatible with patient pj . For example, arc (1,2) in
the graph represents compatibility between donor d1 and patient p2.
A possible kidney exchange is shown in Figure 38b, where dark lines
represent the resulting matches of the run. In the example, the solution of the run
has two cycles of length three (the length of a cycle is the number of arcs/nodes it
contains). In particular, one of the cycles contains arcs (4,5),(5,3) and (3,4), which
correspond to the matches d4−p5,d5−p3, and d3−p4 (i.e., donor d4 is matched
with patient p5, donor d5 is matched with patient p3, and donor d3 is matched with
patient p4). The other cycle contains arcs (1,2),(2,6), and (6,1); that is donor d1 is
matched with patient p2, donor d2 is matched with patient p6, and donor d6 is
matched with patient p1. Patient p7 and donor d7 (in node 7) are not matched and
would have to wait for the next run. Hence, in this example, a total of six
transplants will be performed (the total number of dark lines).
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Figure 38. Example of a KPD match run representation: (a) compatibility graph; (b)
example of a resulting matching of a KPD run without integration with a desensitiza-
tion protocol; (c) extended compatibility graph; (d) example of a resulting matching
of a KPD run integrated with a desensitization protocol
In order to account for the possibility that a patient in the pool could
undergo a desensitization process to increase its compatibility in the pool, we
modified the compatibility graph by adding new arcs to the graph (hereby referred
to as treatment arcs). We refer to the resulting graph as the extended compatibility
graph. The set of treatment arcs represents the new compatibilities among patients
and donors which can be possible for those patients who undergo desensitization.
Let us assume, in our example, the possibility that patients p2 and p7 can undergo a
desensitization therapy. The resulting extended compatibility graph is show in
Figure 38c where three treatment arcs (represented by the dotted lines) were added
to the graph: (3,2),(2,7) and (6,7). Specifically, if the patient denoted by p7 is
desensitized, then s/he would become compatible with donor d2 and donor d6.
Similarly, if patient p2 is desensitized, s/he would become compatible with donor d3.
A kidney exchange in this extended compatible graph, not only determines the
possible matches among compatible pairs, but also determines, among the set of the
patients in the pool, who should be treated with a desensitization protocol. For
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example, Figure 38d represents a possible kidney exchange (represented by the dark
lines) in the extended compatibility graph. This solution requires that patient p7
undergoes desensitization and that a kidney exchange be performed through a cycle
of length four (namely, d1−p2,d2−p6, d6−p7, and d7−p1), and another cycle of
length three (namely, d3−p4, d4−p5, and d5−p3). Hence, by allowing the
integration, a total of seven transplants will be performed.
There are several proposed mathematical formulations in the literature to
solve KEP on a given compatibility graph, the literature usually includes a limit on
the maximum length of a cycle allowed in the solution because of logistical reasons
such as the simultaneous availability of operating rooms (Ferrari et al., 2009;
Johnson et al., 2008; Roth et al., 2007; De Klerk et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2009;
Montgomery et al., 2008). In our experiments, we implemented and solved the cycle
formulation Constantino et al. (2013), which is presented next after introducing
some needed notation. Let G(V,A) be the compatibility graph associated with a
given pool of donor-patients pairs, where V is the set of nodes representing
donor-patient pairs, and A is the set of arcs. Let A+ be the set of treatment arcs,
which represents new compatibilities in the pool due to the ABO desensitization
treatment. This set of arcs is defined by the KPD program in accordance with
specific requirements and goals of the program as well as the consent of the patients.
For example, a transplant program can decide to propose desensitization to the
patients whose PRA is above a given threshold value, or to blood type O patients.
The extended compatibility graph G+(V,A∪A+) is obtained by adding the set of
treatment arcs A+ to the initial set of arcs A. Let C be the set of all cycles in G+,
and Ck ⊆ C be the subset of cycles with length less than or equal to a given
threshold k. We denote Ck(v) the cycles from Ck containing an arc incident to v.
Let wij ,∀(i, j) ∈ A∪A+ be a weight associated with each arc (i, j) in the graph.
These weights are usually used to define the importance (priority) of a transplant.
We define the weight wc of a given cycle c ∈ C as the sum of the weights of the arcs
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that the cycle contains, i.e., wc =
∑
(i,j)∈Cwij . Finally, let us consider the set of
binary variables zc,∀c ∈ Ck, associated with each cycle C in Ck, whose value is equal
to 1 if cycle C is selected to be in the solution and zero otherwise. KEP on G+ can








zc ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V (16)
zc ∈ {0,1}. ∀c ∈ Ck (17)
Model 15 - 17 selects the maximum weight node disjoint cycle packing of the
extended compatibility graph, where cycles can contain at most k nodes.
Specifically, the objective function 15 maximizes the total number of (weighted)
transplants in the solution. If the weights are equal to one, i.e.,
wij = 1,∀(i, j) ∈ A∪A+, then the objective function maximizes the total number of
transplants. Constraint 17 ensure that a node belongs to no more that one of the
selected cycles.
KEP can be easily solved to optimality when only cycles of length two (i.e.,
k = 2) are allowed, however, it was shown to be NP-hard even when only cycles of
length two and three are used (i.e., k = 3) (Abraham et al., 2007), meaning that it is
unlikely there will be an algorithm that always finds the optimal solution quickly in
every instance of the problem. However, integer programming (IP) formulations, as
the one provided here, have been widely used by a variety of authors to solve special
cases of the KEP (Constantino et al., 2013). In our experimentation, k was set to a
maximum value equal to six, which is realistic from a logistical point of view (apart
from very special cases (Sack, 60), the length of the cycles is usually limited to
either 3 or 4 (Constantino et al., 2013)). In addition, the size of the pool in our
experiments is composed of at most 124 incompatible pairs (i.e., the number of
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nodes in the underlying graph is at most equal to 124), which is also deemed
realistic (Gentry et al., 2007). Given this setting, we were able to always solve the
model to optimality. We implemented Model 15 - 17 in Python 2.7 and solved it by
means of the solver Gurobi 7.0.2.
C Experimental Analysis
To evaluate the impact of optimally integrating an ABO desensitization
protocol in a KPD program we performed a series of experiments with different
scenarios. The details of the used data, scenarios characteristics, simulation
strategy, and output measures are provided in the following sections.
1 Data
We used data (provided by the authors of (Anderson et al., 2015)) from two
major KPD programs in the United States: the National Kidney Registry (NKR),
and the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD). The data contained the information of
826 incompatible donor-patients pairs covering a period of 2.5 years. Of the 826
patients, 403 were highly sensitized (patients with PRA greater than or equal to
80). For each pair, the data contained patient and donor blood type, patients’ PRA,
and pair’s historical arrival time. The resulting compatibility graph contained
115,605 arcs.
2 Scenarios
We considered 16 different scenarios by varying: (i) the maximum length k of
a cycle (i.e. k ∈ {3,4,5,6} ) admitted in a KPD run, and (ii) the number δ of
generated treatment arcs. Specifically, we generated the extended compatibility
graph by adding treatment arcs resulting from ABOi desensitization. We used
KPSAM (ver. 4.1.5, the Kidney-Pancreas Simulated Allocation Model) to obtain a
proxy measure for additional compatibilities made possible by removing ABOi.
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KPSAM is a simulation software developed by the US Scientific Registry of
Transplant Recipients (SRTR) (SAM, 2017), it is available for researchers upon
request and is widely used for the impact evaluation of different kidney allocation
protocols at the national level (Israni et al., 2014a). KPSAM is preloaded with the
existing kidney allocation rules and the UNOS national transplant registry data.
For the current study, we used the allocation rules embedded in KPSAM as the
default using data covering years from 2007 to 2008. In order to estimate the
additional compatibility arcs that are made possible via desensitization for ABOi,
we modified the definition of ABO compatibility as shown in Figure 39.
Figure 39. Modification in the ABO compatibility definition in KPSAM
The simulation was ran one time for two scenarios, one with the
aforementioned modification, and another keeping the default compatibility
definition. The simulation results indicated that the average increase in
compatibilities as the result of ABOi desensitization was around 11% of the initial
set of arcs. Given that these numbers serve as an approximate and that the actual
increase in the compatibility arcs depends on other donor and patient factors (such
as ABO antibody titers and donor specific antibody), we tested three different
integrated-scenarios by randomly generating a number of treatment arcs equal to
δ = 2% , δ = 6% and δ = 11% of the initial set of arcs, with the δ = 11% case being




We adapted the simulation strategy used by Anderson et al. (2015) for
simulating the dynamic environment of a kidney exchange pool. An overview of the
adopted strategy for a given scenario is described in Figure 40. The simulation
performs the following six steps:
1. A set of treatment arcs is randomly generated according to the value of
parameter δ .
2. Incompatible pairs are randomly assigned an arrival time by shuffling their
historical arrival time.
3. Eight new participants are added, according to their arrival time, to form the
current exchange pool.
4. The mathematical 15 - 17) is solved for the current pool of incompatible pairs.
5. All the matched nodes are removed from the pool.
6. Steps 3-5 are repeated until no new more participants can be added to the
pool.
For a given scenario, every time the above six steps are performed, we have a
trial. In each trial, when new incompatible pairs enter the system and the pool is
updated (Step 3), we say a new snapshot is created. Since the data contains 826
pairs and each time eight pairs enter the system, each trial contains 104 snapshots
(i.e., the nearest largest integer of the ratio 8266 ).
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Figure 40. Adopted Simulation Strategy
We ran the described procedure to simulate both a KPD program with ABOi
desensitization (integrated-scenario), and a KPD program without desensitization
(baseline-scenario). The difference is in the underling graph on which the
mathematical model, solved in Step 4 of the above described procedure, is applied.
Specifically, the model is solved on the extended compatibility graph for the




In the analysis of the results we considered three groups of patients based on
their PRA: (i) patients with PRA≥ 80, who are highly sensitized patients (80-Level
patients), (ii) patients with 50 < PRA< 80 (50-Level patients), and (iii) patients
with PRA < 50 (0-Level patients). The following statistics are computed to
evaluate the impact of the integration:
1. Transplant rate for all patients. Transplant rate for each trial is computed as
the ratio between the total number of transplants performed in the trial and
the total number of incompatible pairs.
2. Transplant rate for 80-Level (50-Level, 0-Level) patients. The transplant rate
of 80-Level patients (50-Level, 0-Level), in a given trial, is computed as the
ratio between the total number of matched 80-Level (50-Level, 0-Level)
patients and the total number of 80-Level (50-Level, 0-Level) patients in the
system.
3. Transplant rate for patients with blood type O (blood type A, B, and AB). The
transplant rate for blood type O (A, B, AB) patients is computed as the ratio
between the total number of matched blood type O (A, B, AB) patients and
the total number of blood Type O (A, B, AB) patients in the system.
4. Number of snapshots during which highly sensitized patients remain in the
system. For each trial, we record the total number of snapshots each highly
sensitized patient remains in the system before being matched.
D Results
The results of our analysis are shown in Tables 25 - 29 and Figures 41 - 43 .
Table 25 shows, for each scenario, the average transplant rates (computed among
the 20 trials of the scenario) of: (i) all patients; (ii) patients with different PRA
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level; and (iii) patients with different blood types. The baseline-model corresponds
to the rows in the table labeled with δ = 0%. As expected, all the transplant rates
increased with respect to the baseline-scenario both when cycle length increased,
and when a greater number of treatment arcs was added to the initial compatibility
graph. In particular, if we consider the transplant rate for all patients under the
integrated-scenario δ = 11%, the rate of incompatible pairs which can be matched
ranged between 0.93 (when k = 3) and 0.96 (when k = 6). If we look at the
transplant rates for the difficult to match patients (that is 80-Level and blood type
O patients), we can observe when k = 3 and δ = 2% (which is the most conservative
scenario), the transplant rate of matched 80-Level patients was 0.65 (0.36 for the
baseline-scenario), and the transplant rate of matched blood type O patients was
0.72 (0.36 for the baseline-scenario). These rates increase up to 0.94, and 0.96,
respectively, when k = 6 and δ = 11%. From these results we can observe that the
impact of longer cycles on the number of transplants is more evident when the
number of treatment arcs is low (i.e., the advantage of allowing longer chain when
with δ = 2% is greater than when δ = 11%). This shows that the increase in
compatibility among pairs due to the addition of the treatment arcs is much more
impactful than the use of longer cycles, in other words, desensitizing a greater
number of patients improves the transplant rate dramatically and it eliminates the
need of longer cycles.
The impact of the integration is evident from Figure 41, which shows the
boxplots, over the 20 trials, of the percentage increase of the transplant rates, with
respect to the baseline-scenario, for all the integrated-scenarios. Boxplots are shown
considering different patient groups (i.e., all patients, patients with different PRA
level, and patients with different blood types). The percentage increase is computed
as the ratio (XI−XBXB )∗100 , where XI is the value of the statistic computed under
an integrated-scenario, and XB is the value of the statistic computed under the
baseline-scenario. The median of the percentage increase in the transplant rate for
104
all patients ranges between 66% (when k = 3 ) and 68% (when k = 6) when δ = 2% ,
and between 99% (when k = 6) and 111% (when k = 3) when δ = 11%.
From Figure 41, it is evident that the integration of desensitization in a KPD
program affects highly sensitized patients (i.e., 80-level patients) and blood type O
patients the most. Indeed, the median percentage increase in the transplant rate for
80-Level patients ranged between 76% (when k = 6 and δ = 2%) and 148% (when
k = 3 and δ = 11% ), for 50-Level patients the transplant rate ranged between 27%
(when k = 3 and δ = 2%) and 47% (when k = 3and δ = 11% ), for 0-Level patients it
ranged between 69% (when k = 3 and δ = 2% ) and 106% (when k = 3 and δ = 11%
). If we look at the transplant rate increment for different blood types, for blood
type A patients the transplant rate ranged between 29% (when k = 3 and δ = 2% )
and 58% (when k = 3 and δ = 11% ), for blood type B patients it ranged between
38% (when k = 3 and δ = 2% ) and 75% (when k = 3 and δ = 11% ), for blood type
AB patients it ranged between 38% (when k = 3 and δ = 2% ) and 71% (when k = 3
and δ = 11% ), and finally, for blood type O patients it ranged between 103% (when
k = 3 and δ = 2% ) and 167% (when k = 3 and δ = 11% ).
The driver for such a significant increase is due to the change in the structure
of the underlying graph when treatment arcs are added to the pool. Even with 2%
added treatment arcs, the number of cycles in the graph increases exponentially,
hence the probability of finding compatible donors drastically increases. Table 26
shows this characteristic. The table displays the average number of cycles in the
underlying graph for all the scenarios. The average was computed among 20




Average of the transplant rates for, computed among the 20 trials of each scenario
Transplant Rate δ k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
All 0% 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.48
Patients 2% 0.73 0.78 0.80 0.81
6% 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.93
11% 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.96
80-Level 0% 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.43
Patients 2% 0.65 0.72 0.75 0.76
6% 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.90
11% 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.94
50-Level 0% 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.68
Patients 2% 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.89
6% 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96
11% 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
0-Level 0% 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48
Patients 2% 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.86
6% 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95
11% 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98
Blood Type A 0% 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.62
Patients 2% 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.83
6% 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.92
11% 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95
Blood Type B 0% 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.59
Patients 2% 0.73 0.80 0.82 0.82
6% 0.85 0.89 0.91 0.91
11% 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95
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Figure 41. Percentage increase in transplant rates for all patients, for patients with
different PRA level, and for patients with different blood types with respect to dif-
ferent value of k, and when δ = 2% , δ = 6% and δ = 11%.
Integration of desensitization in a KPD program will benefit the patients
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TABLE 26
Average number of cycles in the underlying graph for all the scenarios. The average
is computed among random graphs, containing 50, 100 and 150 incompatible pairs
Number of
Nodes
δ k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
50 0% 60 225 790 2,681
2% 67 264 990 3,666
6% 86 362 1,481 5,990
11% 122 585 2,789 13,413
100 0% 402 2,887 21,332 161,544
2% 461 3,492 27,217 216,892
6% 620 5,256 46,552 423,275
11% 852 8,080 80,058 813,303
150 0% 1224 13,061 143,596 1,600,321
2% 1436 16,292 190,999 2,282,196
6% 1934 24,466 324,362 4,409,516
11% 2692 38,383 572,600 8,779,067
most in need, not only because their chance of getting a transplant increases, but
also because they will stay in the system less. As explained in the previous section,
in each trial, a sequence of snapshots is created. When a snapshot is created, some
of the patients are matched and leave the system while others remain in the system
and are included in the next snapshot which is created by adding eight new
incompatible pairs. For each trial, we recorded the number of snapshots that a
highly sensitized patient remains in the pool before s/he is matched with a
compatible donor. Then, for each scenario, we computed the average among the 20
trials, and converted that average to a proportion. The cumulative distribution of
those proportions is shown in Figure 42. Specifically, each sub-figure shows the
cumulative percentage of 80-Level patients who are matched in less than a given
number of snapshots. Each diagram shows the distribution of the
integrated-scenarios (δ = 2% , δ = 6% and δ = 11%) and of the baseline-scenario
(δ = 0%) for different values of k . From the figure we can observe that, for any
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value of k , as δ increases, the number of snapshots required by 80-Level patients to
be matched decreases. For example, when k = 3 , in the baseline-scenario, 12% of
the highly sensitized patients were matched in the very first snapshot in which they
participated (number of snapshots in the x-axis is equal to 1), while this proportion
was equal to 23% for the integrated-scenario with δ = 2% , and 29% and 32% for the
integrated-scenario when δ = 6% and δ = 11% , respectively. In the baseline-scenario
with k = 3 , only 34% of the highly sensitized patients were matched in less than 50
snapshots, while in the integrated-scenarios this proportion was equal to 61% , 80%
, and 89% when δ = 2% , δ = 6% , and δ = 11% respectively.
Figure 42. Comparison between the baseline-scenario and the integrated-scenarios of
the cumulative percentage of 80-Level patients who are matched in less than a given
number of snapshots
Tables 27-tab:desensitizedrate-bldtype and Figure 43 give an overall picture
of the penetration of the desensitization in the KPD program. Table 27 shows the
average percentage, computed from the 20 trials of each scenario, of matched
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patients who underwent desensitization. Table 28 shows the average percentage of
treated patients with respect to different levels of PRA (i.e., 80-level, 50-level, and
0-level patients). Table 29 shows analogous average percentages computed by
patient’s blood type. Note that, the percentage of desensitized patients ranged
between 0.32 (Table 27, δ = 2%,k = 3) and 0.53 (Table 27, δ = 11%,k = 6 . When
looking at the categories of patients (Table 28 and Table 29), we can see that the
highest percentage of desensitized patients are the 80-Level and the blood type O
patients. Figure 6 reports the average percentage of cycles containing at least one
patient who undergoes desensitization. For example, when δ = 2% and k = 3 , 58%
of the cycles of length 2 contained at least one desensitized patient, 76% of the cycles
of length 3 contained at least one desensitized patient. Figure 43 demonstrates that,
for every integrated scenario, longer cycles are more likely to contain a patient who
underwent desensitization, and this likelihood increases with δ .
TABLE 27
Percentage of matched patients who undergo desensitization for different scenarios
Treated Rate δ k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
All Patients 2% 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.36
6% 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.47
11% 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53
E Conclusion
The present study demonstrated that combining ABO blood group
incompatible desensitization therapy with KPD allocation strategy will offer
immediate opportunities to perform more transplants. Our results indicate that,
even with a limited number of patients undergoing a desensitization treatment and
without allowing too long cycles, on average, one can expect 66% increase in the
transplant rate, 79% increase in the number of highly sensitized patients
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TABLE 28
Percentage of matched 80-level, 50-level, and 0-level patients who undergo desensiti-
zation for different scenarios
Treated Rate δ k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
80-Level 2% 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.62
Patients 6% 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.65
11% 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.65
50-Level 2% 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Patients 6% 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
11% 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
0-Level 2% 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.30
Patients 6% 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27
11% 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26
transplanted, and 101% increase in the number of blood type O patients
transplanted. While further model development and analyses are necessary to
provide practical insights into the KPD exchange programs, our results reveal that
desensitization administered as part of a KPD exchange program is a promising
approach to improve access to and to reduce wait time for a living donor kidney
transplant.
The present study is the first optimization attempt to examine the role of
desensitization in a KPD exchange program even though the model is experimental
and preliminary. The major limitation lies in the fact that our experiment does not
account for several realistic aspects. Our model does not account for: (i) the initial
ABO antibody titer level as well as the amount and cost of required desensitization
given the titer; (ii) the level of initial HLA mismatches and the presence of
donor-specific antibodies (DSAs) as well as the associated desensitization cost; and
(iii) possible failure of either desensitization or a transplant.
Incorporating ABO titer and HLA distributions as well as DSA information
in the model is not an easy task partially because such information is not readily
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TABLE 29
Percentage of matched patients who undergo desensitization for different scenarios
Treated Rate δ k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
Blood Type A 2% 0.2 0.19 0.19 0.19
Patients 6% 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
11% 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.23
Blood Type B 2% 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1
Patients 6% 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
11% 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Blood Type AB 2% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Patients 6% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
11% 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Blood Type O 2% 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70
Patients 6% 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
11% 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
available from the UNOS national transplant registry database. From the limited
data in our center (i.e., The George Washington University Hospital), the
percentages of those patients who are relatively hard to desensitize (i.e., titer ≥ 64)
are about 8% for the blood type A (anti-B) and B (anti-A1 or A2) recipients and
about 60% for the blood type O (anti-A1, A2 or B) recipients. For these patients,
desensitization is performed with plasmapheresis over a period of time as far as the
patients has a living-donor and the original titer level is not too high (i.e., >512). In
terms of the desensitization targeting HLA antibodies, the patients with higher
PRA are generally harder to desensitize, and low PRA patients with high levels of
cross-match reactivity to common HLA types are also difficult to desensitize (Gloor
et al., 2010).
The cost of transplantation would be inevitably high for these patients.
Currently, in our center a typical bortezomib-based induction therapy increases the
cost of transplantation by $ 10,000 to $ 13,000. A round of plasmapheresis (if the
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Figure 43. Average percentage of cycles that contains at least one treatment arc for
k ∈ {3,4,5,6} and δ = 2%, δ = 6% , δ = 11%.
titer is above 64) adds additional $ 1,000 to $ 2,000 to the cost. Estimating the
total desensitization cost for the patients with various profiles would require further
data collection and analyses. Similarly, the HLA mismatch level and the DSA
prevalence for the patients with a given blood type and ABO titer would require
further data collection and analyses. Incorporating these heterogeneities in the
levels of antibodies and desensitization costs in the model will be immediate steps
to extend our model. The extensions would require more complex calculations to be
performed.
Including transplant outcomes with a different desensitization level in the
model is another important step to make the model more realistic. Some literature
suggests that transplant outcomes among desensitized patients, especially the highly
sensitized patients, are poorer than those patients who received transplants without
desensitization (Haririan et al., 2009; Montgomery et al., 2011; Ferrari et al., 2009).
However, in terms of the ABO antibody desensitization, evidence suggests that both
short- and long-term patient mortality and graft failure rates do not differ between
ABO compatible transplants and ABO incompatible transplants with
desensitization (Opelz et al., 2015; Montgomery et al., 2012). In contrast, evidence
on the inferior outcomes of HLA incompatible transplants seem to be well
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established (Pankhurst et al., 2017; Lefaucheur et al., 2010). The outcomes of ABO
+ HLA incompatible transplants are reported to be similar to the outcomes of HLA
incompatible transplants, suggesting that there are no synergistic effects between
anti- blood group and HLA antibodies (Couzi et al., 2015).
The current study focused on the impact of combining KPD and ABO
antibody desensitization on the efficiency of kidney transplants. Given that the
desensitization is possible for most KPD patients in the absence of DSA and high
level HLA mismatches, we opine that the estimated increase in the transplant rate
presented here is not too far from the reality. Whether such a combined therapy is
cost effective for all patients regardless of the titer level is another question. To
explore such a question, however, further data collection and analysis will be
required to estimate wait time for a living donor with a better match or for a
deceased donor transplant as well as the cost of dialysis and clinical implications of
the prolonged time on dialysis.
It should also be noted that the expected increase in transplants reported
here is a long-run outcome, and the time it takes to reach the long-run state
depends on how quickly transplant centers are willing to explore the combined
procedure, especially the ABOi transplants. In December 2014, the new national
kidney allocation system (KAS) was introduced to support transplants between
A2/A2B deceased donors and B patients (Martins et al., 2018). The number of
A2/A2B to B transplants has been growing for the last 4 years. However, the
growth rate remains around 1% per annum as the speed of accommodating this new
policy differs by transplant center.
Finally, many KPD programs specify a hierarchy of allocation criteria (Lee
et al., 2009; Manlove and O’Malley, 2012; Kim et al., 2007; Glorie et al., 2014)
which considers several factors in addition to the total number of transplants. Such
factors include prioritization of highly sensitized patients and of patients with low
match probability, length of the cycles and of the chains, patients’ wait time, age of
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patients and donors, travel distance between matched pairs, quality adjusted life
years, etc. Our model can also be extended to account for multiple objectives to
account for these factors.
Despite the limitations and extensions warranted to fully understand the
desensitization effects, we consider that our finding provides meaningful implications
and direction for the future KPD research, especially in light of ever-exacerbating
access to both living and deceased donor renal transplant and the recent nationwide
attention to the KPD exchange system.
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CHAPTER VI
ALLOCATING KIDNEYS IN OPTIMIZED HETEROGENEOUS
CIRCLES
A Introduction
Geographic residence is the most important determinant of access to kidney
transplant in the United States (Zhou et al., 2018; Formica, 2018). There is more
variation in transplant access attributable to donor service areas (DSA) than any
other candidate characteristic, such as calculated panel reactive antibody (cPRA),
blood type, kidney disease etiology, and socioeconomic status(Stewart et al., 2018).
In July 2018, the Secretary of Health and Human Resources advised the Organ
Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN) to eliminate DSAs and regions and
develop allocation schemes consistent with the Final Rule (DHHS), which states
that organ allocation should not be based on waitlisted candidate’s residence or
transplant center listing.
The OPTN Kidney-Pancreas Workgroup initially put forth a “hybrid”
allocation framework using a 500 nautical mile (nm) fixed-distance circle around
each donor hospital with continuous score priority for candidates nearer to donor
hospital (OKT). In public comments, the proposal was criticized for not considering
the variation in deceased donor supply and organ procurement organization (OPO)
donor authorization rates across the country. Commenters also noted that some
transplant centers’ circles comprised mostly oceans and other countries.
Commenters variously argued for larger circle sizes, given kidneys’ ability to tolerate
relatively long cold ischemia times with minimal negative patient outcomes (Stewart
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et al., 2016), or for smaller circle sizes to decrease travel burden for rurally located
transplant centers. Ultimately, the workgroup settled on a 250 nm fixed-distance
circle solution for all transplant centers.
Heterogeneous circles, that is, circles of different sizes in different places,
might better balance supply and demand needs around the country. We used our
BOundary Allocation Problem model, that we developed in chapter III to design
heterogeneous circles around donor hospitals for kidney allocation and minimize the
variability in supply/demand ratios across transplant centers.
B Method
Data Source We used data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
(SRTR) that includes data on all donor, wait-listed candidates, and transplant
recipients in the U.S., submitted by the members of the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN). The Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provides
oversight to the activities of the OPTN and SRTR contractors.
Data Population We studied 49,099 transplanted deceased kidney donors and
131,706 waitlist candidates from 236 transplant centers from 2014 to 2017. We
excluded discarded kidneys, multi-organ waitlist candidates, inactive candidates,
and hospitals in Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Alaska. We used 2017 data for the
training set and 2014 to 2016 data for the test sets.
Optimized Heterogeneous Circles Using 2017 data, we used an special case of
the BAP model to design heterogeneous circles around donor hospitals to minimize
the variation in supply/demand ratios across transplant centers, that is, to minimize
the largest difference between any transplant center’s supply/demand ratio and the
national average supply/demand ratio. The model’s constraints ensured that the
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TABLE 30
Numbers of donor hospitals, transplant centers, incident candidates, and deceased
donor kidneys transplanted for each year
2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of Transplant
Centers
236 238 235 236
Incident Active Waitlist
Candidates
32,460 33,648 33,014 34,275
Number of Donor Hospitals 1,352 1,430 1,527 1,479
Deceased Donor Kidneys
Transplanted
12,086 12,596 13,589 14,593
circle around each donor hospital included at least one transplant center. Circle size
options in the model were 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 nm. Of those options, the
model selected the best circle size for each donor hospital that minimized
supply/demand ratio ratios across all transplant centers. The mathematical model
for designing optimized heterogeneous circles is presented in Appendix C. After
choosing the best circle size for each donor hospital, we compared the results with
allocation of kidneys within homogeneous circles of 250 nm and 500 nm in size.
Supply/Demand Ratio For each donor hospital, supply was defined as the
number of kidneys recovered and transplanted. Demand was the number of active
incident kidney waitlist candidates per year, excluding prevalent waitlist candidates
(Table 30). The supply/demand ratio for a transplant center was the number of
allocated kidneys, divided by number of incident waitlist candidates. We allocated
supply proportionate to each transplant center’s number of waitlisted candidates.
For example, suppose 90 kidneys were recovered in a single donor hospital, and that
hospital’s allocation circle contained transplant centers A and B. If transplant
center A had 70 waitlisted candidates while transplant center B had 30, 70% of the
90 recovered kidneys would be allocated to transplant center A and the remainder
to transplant center B.
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Average Travel Distance We compared the average distance that a kidney
would travel under heterogeneous and homogeneous circle allocation.
Sensitivity Analysis
• Maximum Circle Size: We tested a range of maximum circle sizes from 200
nm to 1000 nm, in increments of 100, to analyze the effect of increasing the
allowable circle size on variation of supply/demand ratios and average distance
traveled by organs. The minimum circle size was always 100 nm.
• Supply and Demand Changes Over Time: Given that supply and
demand naturally vary over time, we investigated whether our optimized
heterogeneous circles were robust to changes in supply and demand. Using
data from 2017, we designed heterogeneous circles. Then, we calculated the
supply/demand ratios using three years of data, 2014 to 2016, that was not
used in designing our heterogeneous circles. We compared the variation in
supply/demand ratios across transplant centers for heterogeneous circles with
homogeneous circles for each of the years.
Statistical Analysis The integer program was solved using the Gurobi 2.7
optimizer with Python 3, yielding an optimal circle size for each donor hospital.
C Results
Optimized Heterogeneous Circles Figure 44 shows the circle size and total
supply at each donor hospital. Each point on the map represents a donor hospital
and the color shows the circle size for the donor hospital. 14% of recovered kidneys
were distributed within a circle of 100 nm, 17% within a circle of 200 nm, 20%
within a circle of 300 nm, 17% within a circle of 400 nm and 32% within a circle of
500 nm.
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Figure 44. Optimized Heterogeneous Circle Size. Each point represents a donor
hospital and the color shows the circle size for the donor hospital.
Supply/Demand Ratio The supply/demand ratios across transplant centers for
heterogeneous circles ranged from 0.41 to 0.43 (median 0.42) organs per candidate.
For 250 nm homogeneous circles, supply/demand ratios ranged from 0.1 to 0.75
(median 0.42) organs per candidate, and for 500 nm homogeneous circles,
supply/demand ratios ranged from 0.21 to 0.61 (median 0.41) organs per candidate
(Figure 45).
Average Travel Distance We calculated the average distance traveled by a
kidney under homogeneous and heterogeneous circles (Figure 46). Average travel
distance is 194 nm for our heterogeneous circles, 131 nm for 250 nm homogeneous
circles, and 273 nm for 500 nm homogeneous circles. The travel distance across
transplant centers ranged from 81 to 288 nm for our heterogeneous circles, and for
250 nm homogeneous circles ranged from 38 to 206 nm and for 500 nm
homogeneous circles ranged from 103 to 374 nm.
D Sensitivity Analysis
Varying Maximum Circle Size We considered optimizing heterogeneous circles
using different values for the maximum circle size allowed, and calculated the
resulting variation in supply/demand ratios across transplant centers and average
120
travel distance. For heterogeneous circles with maximum circle size of 200 nm,
supply/demand ratios ranged from 0.15 to 1.00 organs per candidate; for maximum
circle size of 500 nm, the ratios ranged from 0.41 to 0.43 organs per candidate; for
maximum circle size of 1000 nm, the ratios ranged from 0.41 to 0.44 organs per
candidate (Figure 47). Allowing larger circles decreased the variation in
supply/demand ratios, but only up to 500 nm. No circles need to be larger than 500
nm in a heterogeneous circle system to achieve geographic equity in supply/demand
ratios.
For heterogeneous circles with maximum circle size of 200 nm the average
travel distance was 72 nm, for maximum circle size of 500 nm was 194 nm, and for
maximum circle size of 1000 nm was 272 nm (Figure 48). Allowing larger circles
increased the average distance traveled by donor kidneys. The average travel
distance for heterogeneous circles is always less than for 500 nm homogeneous
circles. The average travel distance for heterogeneous circles is less than that for 250
nm homogeneous circles when the maximum circle size is less than or equal to 400
nm.
Supply and Demand Changes Over Time For every year from 2014 to 2017,
the heterogeneous circles we designed using 2017 data yielded a much narrower
distribution of supply/demand ratios than did homogeneous circles of any size
(Figure 49).
E Discussion
We used an integer-programming model to design heterogeneous circles
around donor hospitals that reduced supply/demand ratios variation across
transplant centers, as compared to homogeneous circles of size 250 and 500 nm. We
found that smarter sharing with heterogeneous circles decreased geographic
disparity compared with either size homogeneous circles. Our circles were robust to
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changes in supply and demand over time. Using heterogeneous circles for kidney
allocation, no circles need to be larger than 500 nm, and many circles can be smaller
than that, while mitigating geographic disparity. More than 50% of the kidneys
were recovered in hospitals with circle size equal to or less than 300 nm. With
optimized heterogeneous circles, supply/demand ratios ranged from 0.41 to 0.43
organs per candidate, for 250 nm homogeneous circles these ratios ranged from 0.10
to 0.75 organs per candidate, and for 500 nm homogeneous circles these ratios
ranged from 0.21 to 0.61. The average distance a kidney would travel using
heterogeneous circles was more than that of 250 nm homogeneous circles, but less
than 500 nm circles. The average travel distance across all transplant centers under
heterogeneous circle allocation is less than 300 nm.
Optimized heterogeneous circles achieved near-perfect equity in
supply/demand ratio, with slightly larger average travel distance compared with 250
nm circles. After the 2014 Kidney Allocation System (KAS) changes, the
percentage of regionally and nationally distributed transplants increased, and
average travel distance increased from 194 to 267 miles while cold ischemia times
(CIT) increased to 18 hours(Stewart et al., 2016). The increase in CIT was not
related to graft loss or patient survival, however. While long CIT is a determinant
of organ discard (Narvaez et al., 2018; Friedewald and Turgeon, 2017), total CIT is
not all attributable to travel (Mohan et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2019). In same
hospital kidney transplants, the median CIT is 13 hours (95% CI: 8.5 – 19.0 hours)
and similar to other hospital kidney transplants with median CIT of 16.5 hours
(95% CI: 11.3 – 22.6; citechow2018long). Heterogeneous circle allocation would be
unlikely to increase CIT or result in negative patient outcomes, and other
intervention targets for decreasing CIT exist (Mohan et al., 2018).
In designing the newly approved 250 nm circle allocation framework, the
OPTN did not apply mathematical modeling to optimize the allocation circle sizes
around donor hospitals. In contrast to liver allocation(Gentry et al., 2015, 2013;
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Haugen et al., 2019), there are few proposals describing design solutions for
geographic allocation units for kidneys. We and other researchers have used
mathematical modeling to design systems for liver and kidney allocation to reduce
geographic disparities (Gentry et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2015).
Measuring geographic disparity in access to transplantation is
methodologically challenging (Zhou et al., 2018). Metrics that have been used
include waiting time (Davis et al., 2015; Ashby et al., 2007; ?), transplant rate
Friedewald et al. (2013), and supply/demand ratio variation with various definitions
of supply and demand (Mathur et al., 2010). Our metric of supply/demand ratio is
similar to Stewart’s Access to Transplant Score (ATS), which captured variation in
deceased donor kidney transplant rates after accounting for candidate’s
characteristics and intentional disparities codified by allocation policy (Stewart
et al., 2018). The denominator of our metric, number of waitlisted candidates, is the
same. The numerator of our metric is number of kidneys recovered for transplant,
and most of the kidneys recovered are transplanted (Cooper et al., 2019).
Optimized heterogeneous circles could be designed using other definitions of supply
and demand. For example, supply could be defined using eligible deaths instead of
deceased donor organs recovered and transplanted, addressing concerns about
center-level variation in donor authorization and acceptance practices.
We were unable to assess the effect of our policy on waiting time and
transplant rate, incorporating patient and center-level characteristics, because
kidney allocation within heterogeneous circles is incompatible with the
Kidney-Pancreas Simulation Allocation Model (KPSAM). We considered all
patients equally likely to receive an organ, regardless of their age, race, blood type,
waiting time, KAS score, and other candidate characteristics. To partially account
for accept/decline decisions, we defined supply as the number of recovered kidneys
that were transplanted. Considering the allocation circles as equivalent to the
regions, and since fewer than 19% of kidneys are allocated outside their regions
123
(Stewart et al., 2016), equalizing supply/demand ratio within the circles while
neglecting the disposition of nationally allocated kidneys is justified. Adding a
continuous scoring system like the one recently approved, that penalizes longer
travel within these circles, would decrease travel distances and so our estimates of
average travel distance are likely overestimates.
Recent kidney allocation policy changes include 250 nm homogeneous circles,
but we found that heterogeneous circles would reduce geographic disparity in supply
to demand ratios much more effectively than homogeneous circles. We designed
heterogeneous circles with sizes ranging from 100 nm and 500 nm that reduced
geographic variation in supply/demand ratios compared to 250 and 500 nm
homogeneous circles and resulted in reasonable average travel distance of 194 nm.
Accounting for differences in geography, population density, waitlist size, and
donation rates around the country within a mathematical model yields better
results than using the same circle size everywhere.
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Figure 45. The Variation in Supply/Demand Ratio across Transplant Centers. Each
point represents a transplant center. (A) homogeneous circles with size 250 nm, (b)
homogeneous circles with size 500 nm, and (c) heterogeneous circles with maximum
circle size 500 nm.
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Figure 46. Variation in Average Travel Distance across Transplant Centers. The
average distance traveled by kidneys for each transplant center under heterogeneous
and homogeneous circles.
Figure 47. Ranging maximum circle size from 200 to 1000 nm, variation in sup-
ply/demand ratio across transplant centers under heterogeneous circles on the left
side, comparing to the variation in supply/demand ratios under homogeneous circles
of size 250 and 500 nm on the right side.
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Figure 48. Sensitivity Analysis on Maximum Circle Size. Ranging maximum circle
size from 200 to 1000 nm, average distance traveled by donor kidneys under hetero-
geneous comparing to homogeneous circles.
Figure 49. Sensitivity analysis showing performance of homogeneous circles and het-




The objective of this dissertation was to improve access to organ transplants
in the U.S. by using optimization and simulation modeling. We specifically focused
on kidney and heart allocation systems. The primary goals in this research were to
reduce geographic disparity in access to organ transplants by a better usage of
recovered organs and to develop an alternative allocation policy.
In Chapter II, we used the Thoracic Simulation Allocation Model (TSAM),
and we analyzed the potential impact of the new heart allocation policy, which was
approved in 2016, on geographic disparity in access to heart transplants. No
previous work had conducted such an analysis. In our statistical analysis, we
measured geographic disparity in access to heart transplants in terms of waiting
time, transplant rate, pre-transplant mortality rate, and travel distance before and
after this policy. Our results indicated that geographic disparity in access to heart
transplants is likely to persist despite the changes stemming from the new allocation
policy.
As a first approach to reduce geographic disparity in access to heart
transplant, we analyzed the organ utilization rate across the country, which
indicated a geographic disparity in organ utilization. We also used Cox regression
modelling and Kaplan-Meier survival analysis to analyze the transplant outcomes
from transplanted hearts with prior offer refusal. Our results indicated that 37% of
hearts that have been discarded across the country do not have worse outcomes and
do not affect graft failure.
In Chapter III, as a second approach to reduce geographic disparity in access
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to heart transplants, we defined the boundary allocation problem (BAP), which is a
mixed integer non-linear model, to design heterogeneous zonal structures around
donor hospitals. No previous study had used optimization modeling to address
geographic disparity in access to heart transplants. We defined a new metric to
measure geographic disparity in access to transplants, that is, a function of supply
to demand ratio and of the distance between supply and demand locations. We
developed another optimization model to tune the parameters in the BAP model.
Our tuning approach indicated that designing three zones around donor hospitals
was sufficient. Our results indicated that heterogenous zonal structure substantially
reduced geographic disparity in access to heart transplants. We tested the
robustness of our optimized heterogeneous zonal structure by changing supply and
demand, and our results showed that the heterogeneous zonal structure was robust
with respect to these changes.
In Chapter IV, we developed a discrete event simulation model for evaluating
different heart allocation systems. Our objective in developing a new simulation
model was to compare the impact of alternative allocation policies, which was not
feasible via the TSAM executable made available to the public. In doing so, we have
independently replicated most (if not all) of the concepts framed in TSAM. One
major issue with TSAM was that it was not compatible with heterogeneous zonal
structures, which we overcame with this new simulation model. We tested the
heterogeneous zonal structure designed by BAP model, presented in chapter 3, using
this simulation model. Our results indicated that the heterogeneous zonal structure
reduced geographic disparity in access to heart transplants in terms of transplant
rate and waiting time. Additionally, this simulation model will be accessible for
other researchers in the field to design and test their own allocation policies.
In Chapter VI, we focused on reducing geographic disparity in access to
kidney transplants by improving organ utilization. We investigated integrating
desensitization protocols into a kidney paired donation (KPD) program.
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Pre-transplant desensitization can be administered to overcome the incompatibility
between living donors and kidney recipients, although desensitization alone is likely
to fail for those pairs with significant incompatibilities. For these pairs,
desensitization can be administered in combination with KPD exchange. We used
an integer programming model to incorporate desensitization as a way to increase
KPD efficiency and embedded it into a simulation framework to evaluate the impact
of optimally integrating a desensitization protocol in a KPD program. This was the
first attempt to quantify the benefit of such an integration.
We performed an extensive experimental analysis to evaluate the effect of
incorporating desensitization protocol into the KPD program on different groups of
patients, especially patients with different blood types and with different levels for
panel reactive antibodies (PRA). Additionally, we analyzed the number of iterations
that a patient waits until he/she is matched with a compatible donor. Our results
indicated that desensitization as part of a KPD program is a promising approach to
improve access to and to reduce wait time for a living donor renal transplant.
In Chapter 6, we focused on addressing geographic disparity in access to
kidney transplants by using the BAP model to design heterogeneous circles around
donor hospitals. The new kidney allocation policy, proposed by OPTN, replaces the
DSA and regions in the kidney allocation system with a circle of 250 nautical miles
(nm). The radius for this circle is homogeneous across donor hospitals, and it is not
defined based on any optimization modeling but on expert opinion. Our analysis
showed that our optimized heterogeneous circles significantly reduced geographic
disparity in access to kidney transplants without increasing travel distance.
Further possible research directions to extend the result of this research are
the following:
• In the current heart allocation system, all the transplant centers that are
located in the same zone around a donor hospital have equal access to the
supply in that donor hospital. For instance, consider a donor hospital with
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Zone A of size 500 miles, which includes two transplant centers in this zone,
one 100 miles away and another one 400 miles away. If an organ is recovered
in this donor hospital, both transplant centers have equal chances to receive
the organ regardless of their distance. In developing our BAP model, we also
made the same assumption and we differentiated between transplant centers’
access to transplants if they were located in different zones. Recently, different
organ allocation committees have been trying to incorporate a continuous
allocation policy [REF]. The continuous allocation policy uses a scoring
function to differentiate between transplant centers that have different
distances from the donor hospital. An optimization model can be defined that,
in addition to finding the optimal boundary for each donor hospital, it defines
and incorporates the optimal scoring function to distinguish between
transplant centers within the same zone.
• In developing the simulation model for the U.S. heart allocation system, we
used historical data for patient and organ arrival into the system and for the
updates in patients’ medical conditions. Estimating patient and organ arrivals
with a probability distribution, and estimating the patients status updates
using a transition probability matrix can be considered as the next steps for
the simulation model.
• When incorporating desensitization protocols into KPD, we did not consider
some of the uncertainties encountered in matching living donors and kidney
recipients. However, further data collection and simulation modeling will be
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Appendix A: Supplements to Chapter III
In this section we define the Boundary Allocation Problem (BAP) model for
designing heterogeneous zonal structure consist of three zones around donor
hospitals. We define the binary variable xskfj which is equal to one if cs, s ∈ C1, is
the external circle of zone z1 around donor hospital j; ck, k ∈ C2s is the external
circle zone z2 around j; and cf , f ∈ C3k is the external circle of z3 around j, where
C1 = {1,2, . . . , q−2}, C2s = {s+ 1, . . . , q−1}, and C3k = {k+ 1, . . . , q}, are the index
set of the external circle of z1, the index set of the outer circle of z2 when the inner
circle is cs, and the index set of the outer circle of z3 when the inner circle is ck,
respectively. Additionally, we define parameter bskfj as the weighted sum of the
demands dt of the transplant centers t associated with the donor hospital j when












The mathematical formulation of BAP when defining three zones around each donor






























































sj , ∀t ∈ T (24)
xskfj ∈ {0,1}, ∀s ∈ C1, ∀k ∈ C2s , ∀f ∈ C3k , ∀j ∈H (25)
The objective function (18) minimizes disparity in access level across the
transplant centers. Constraints (19)–(21) ensure that, for each donor hospital j,
each zone contains at least one transplant center. Constraints (22) ensure a
transplant center is associated with at least one donor hospital. Constraints (23)
ensure that each zone around each donor hospital is properly defined, and, finally,
constraint (24) define the access level for each transplant center.
Appendix B: Supplements to Chapter IV
TSAM Input Data (2009 – 2011)
Tables 31 and 32 show the information about TSAM input data set. This
data contains records of 5,866 transplant candidates and 3,769 recovered heart
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organs from July 1st, 2009 to June 30th, 2011. Additionally, this data contains
information about 2,554 transplant candidates that are waiting for heart transplants
prior to July 1st, 2009.
TABLE 31
TSAM Input Data: number of recovered heart organs categorized on some of year,
age, race and blood type.
Number Percentage
Year 2009 910 24%
2010 1905 51%
2011 954 25%












Modified Heart Allocation System
Table 33 shows the allocation policy for allocating heart organs from adult
donors to adult transplant candidates inside three zones around donor hospitals.
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TABLE 32
TSAM Input Data: number of transplant candidates categorized by year, status, age,
race, and blood type.
Number Percentage





















This allocation policy was used in Chapter IV for analyzing heterogeneous zonal
structure versus homogeneous zonal structure.
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TABLE 33
The heart allocation system with three status definition for transplant candidates
inside the first three zones around donor hospitals
Sequence Zone Candidate’s Status Blood Type Compatibility
1 Local 1A Identical
2 Local 1A Compatible
3 Local 1B Identical
4 Local 1B Compatible
5 Zone A 1A Identical
6 Zone A 1A Compatible
7 Zone A 1B Identical
8 Zone A 1B Compatible
9 Local 2 Identical
10 Local 2 Compatible
11 Zone B 1A Identical
12 Zone B 1A Compatible
13 Zone B 1B Identical
14 Zone B 1B Compatible
15 Zone A 2 Identical
16 Zone A 2 Compatible
17 Zone C 1A Identical
18 Zone C 1A Compatible
19 Zone C 1B Identical
20 Zone C 1B Compatible
21 Zone C 2 Identical
22 Zone C 2 Compatible
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OPTN Data (2011 – 2014)
The OPTN data set included heart transplant information from 1999 to 2014.
This data set has more than 85,157 records and contains 165 features about
transplant candidates and 242 features about recovered organs. We used Python for
cleaning and preparing the data for the simulation model. We used data from
January 1st, 2011 to December 31st, 2014. During this study period there were
22,893 recovered heart organs, and 13,084 adult transplant candidates registered on
transplant waiting list. Tables 34 and 35 show the information of main
characteristics about recovered organs and transplant candidates.
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TABLE 34
OPTN Data: number of recovered heart organs categorized on some of year, age, race
and blood type.
Number Percentage




















OPTN Data: number of transplant candidates categorized by year, status, age, race,
and blood type.
Number Percentage





















Appendix C: Supplements to Chapter VI
In this section we define special case of the BAP model for designing
heterogeneous circle for kidney allocation system. We define H as the set of m
donor hospitals, and T as the set of n kidney transplant centers. We defined
C = {1,2, ..., q} as the predefined set of circles around each donor hospital. We want
to select the best circle from C for each donor hospital to minimize the variation in
supply/demand ratio across transplant centers. We define the binary variable xsj
which is equal to one if s, s ∈ C, is the selected circle around donor hospital j.
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Additionally, we define binary parameter asjt, which is equal to one if transplant
center t is located inside the circle s around donor hospital j, and zero otherwise. It
should be noted that supply/demand ratio in this model is the same as access level
defined in Chapter III. If we consider dt as the demand at transplant center t, and
sj as supply in donor hospital j, then the supply/demand ratio (or access level) for










The mathematical formulation of BAP for design heterogeneous circles

















asjtxsj ≥ 1, ∀t ∈ T (28)
∑
s∈C









sj , ∀t ∈ T (30)
xsj ∈ {0,1}, ∀s ∈ C, ∀j ∈H (31)
The objective function (26) minimizes disparity in access level
(supply/demand ratio) across kidney transplant centers. Constraints (27)) ensure
that, for each donor hospital j, each circle contains at least one transplant center.
Constraints (28) ensure each transplant center is associated with at least one donor
hospital. Constraints (29) ensure that just one circle is assigned to a donor hospital,
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